A Boundary among Reference, Sense and Meaning:
An Essence for Translating Rhetorical Statements

Bikhtiyar O. Fattah

Department of English Language, Faculty of Education, Koya University, Kurdistan Region, Iraq

ABSTRACT

This study, which examines the contributions of the translators' awareness of the boundary among the notions *reference*, *sense* and *meaning* in translating rhetorical statements, aims at identifying the notions of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning* and how the translators' familiarity with a boundary among these concepts would be helpful in the process of translating rhetorical statements. This process is a very challenging one because the translation of such types of statements could not be fulfilled without translators' familiarity with the three essential levels of meaning which are: referential meaning (reference), conceptual meaning (sense), and contextual meaning (meaning). This study employs a qualitative approach to determine the influence of translators' familiarity with the boundary among these notions and their contributions in the process of translating rhetorical statements. It is qualitative for having an experimental group and a controlling group of translators to investigate the influences of being familiar with the notions of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning* on their translation. One of the significant findings of this study is that Kurdish translators who are not familiar with the boundary among these notions usually resort to referential meaning (reference) and conceptual meaning (sense) in translating rhetorical statements; however, after being familiarized with these notions and their distinctive features, they effectively employ contextual meaning (meaning) in translating rhetorical statements and arrive at the precise and understandable translation of them.

1. INTRODUCTION

Translation is the process of conveying meaning from a source language into a target language. The propensity to select the appropriate translation technique is the most significant issue to translators. It is crucial for translators to be aware of the selection of suitable translation strategies based on the requirement of the employed text. Going over some translated texts can prove the failure of translators in precisely translating some statements. Researchers have recommended many translation strategies to translators to adopt while translating a text from a language to another. Newmark (1988) categorizes texts according to their functions into (expressive,

informative, vocative, aesthetic, phatic and metalingual) illustrating that diversity in the function of texts requires certain strategies. For instance, the strategies that are required for translating informative texts are different from those that are needed for translating aesthetic texts. There is a consensus among researchers regarding the strategies employed in the process of translation; for example, Newmark (1988) propose many procedures including transference, naturalization, cultural equivalent, functional equivalent, descriptive equivalent, through translation, etc. which are also adopted by researchers like Molina & Hurtado Albir (2002), and Darwish (2010). The focus of the majority of researchers interested in translation is on the strategies employed while translating. However, this study focuses on the contribution of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning* in providing the right interpretation of the words that constitute statements to attain a successful translation process.

1.1. Statement of the problem

Translators face serious difficulties in translating literary texts as these texts are often rich in rhetorical statements. Retaining the slyness, delicacy, elusion, aesthetics and the theme of the statements in the original text are the main concerns in the process of translation; however, they are often not achieved in most of the translated literary texts. Moreover, although translators are generally well familiar with the translation types, strategies, principles and methods, they sometimes face difficulties in providing the precise translation of rhetorical statements.

1.2 The aims of the Study

This study aims at investigating the influence of translators' familiarity with reference, sense and meaning on their translation, and determining the role of engaging *reference*, *sense* and *meaning* in precisely interpreting words and statements in translation. This study uses a qualitative approach in the process of data collection and analysis; it is qualitative for having an experimental group and a controlling group of translators to investigate the influences of being familiar with the notions of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning* on their translation.

1.3 Research Questions

This study tries to answer the following questions:

1. How does translators' unfamiliarity with the boundary among notions of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning* affect the accuracy of the translated rhetorical statements?
2. How does translators' familiarity with the notions of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning* help the process of translating rhetorical statements?

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section comprehensively considers four essential concepts which are *reference*, *sense*, *meaning* and rhetorical statements. The comprehensive elaboration on these concepts helps to identify these concepts in detail especially *reference*, *sense* and *meaning* as these concepts are to a great extent need further elaborations in order to draw a boundary among them.

2.1 Reference

Reference is the source and the indispensable constituent of human language. It cannot be detached from language because a language generally becomes useless and cannot fulfill the process of interaction successfully without reference (Ankersmit, 2012). There is a kind of agreement among philosophers and linguists that the concept *reference* represents the process by which language is used to identify words that denote objects or things in the real world.

Ankersmit (2012, p. 87) states that "from Frege and Russell and all the way to Strawson and Searle, *reference* has been a hot topic in philosophical debate, eagerly researched and eagerly discussed" as a consequence of these eagerness many theories, assumptions and ideas came into existence. However, in the 1970s with the dominance of pragmatics and the start of cognitive linguistics, the notion and the phenomenon of *reference* started to lose its significance in the process of semantic studies and assumptions (Nöth, 1995, p.93).

Considering the meaning of words with the use of *reference* is one of the earliest semiotic attempts on language and meaning. However, the way the assumptions and clarifications are assigned to this theory may vary from one scholar to another. Frege's theory on 'Bedeutung' (reference) (1892); Russels' theory on 'denotation' (1905); Nöth, (1995); De Saussure's dichotomy of *signifier* and *signified* (1916); Aitcheson, (2003); Wittgenstein's assumption on the relationship between names and things (1922) in which he beholds that "the name means the object [and] the object is its meaning" and McGinn (1987) have all showed the significance of reference in language and meaning studies. Although these theories and assumptions may vary in the process of identifying *reference*, determining its status in language, and illustrating its role in the consideration of meaning, they all agree on the point that *reference* is an indispensable integrating element of language.

Precisely, according to Putnam (1979, p.215), "reference is fixed by meaning only in the sense of being a component of meaning, but not in the sense that meaning is a mechanism for fixing reference". Based on this definition for identifying reference, one may resort to

a mechanism. For example, it is the specialized people that can make a distinction between gold and any other metal that looks like gold, and the process of recognition based on some mechanisms and procedures. Moreover, the relationship between reference and proper names could be another attempt to identify the existence and the role of *reference* in meaning construction. For Donnellan (1972, p.357), *reference* can be acquired by 'proper names' based on two successive commitments: firstly through providing a satisfactory description to the reference to which the proper name refers, and secondly the referent should represent and match the provided description.

Thus, *reference* is generally regarded as one of the essential components of language comprehension. However, this notion appears to be "more problematic than we are inclined to think and that historical terms that appear to refer" (Ankersmit, 2012, p.90). According to Al-Sulaimaan (2016), there is a consensus among linguists that the concept of *reference* is defined as the process by which language is used to identify words that represent objects or things in the real world. However, Al-Sulaimaan (2016, p.108) believes that "it is not as simple as" has been stated above, because we still refer to a person that we do not know his /her name. For more clarification, one may ask his classmate in a PhD program, *Can I use your philosophy of language*; here the phrase *your philosophy of language* does not refer to the hearer's assumption and philosophy about language, but refers to a book titled *Philosophy of Language*.

Based on the above provided definitions and clarifications regarding the *reference*, two points draw the attention of researchers and readers. The first is that *reference* is connected to the process that identifies a referent (an object) in the real word. And the second point is that all the philosophers and linguists associate *reference* with identifying things and/or proper names in reality without making any effort or assumption regarding the possibility of associating reference as a process to cover actions and modifications as well.

2.2 Sense

The word *sense* (from the Germanic *Sinn*) was first introduced by the German scholar Frege in his work titled *On Sense and Reference*, in which he dealt with the concept of *sense* as a representative thought of a well-formed and meaningful sentence. For Frege, *sense* is connected with the nature of representation of a phrase, sentence, or item referred to; therefore, any item, phrase, or sentence can initiate different representations or different senses (McGinn, 1987, p.34).

One of the most significant characteristics by which the notion of *sense* is recognized is connected with the identification of the semantic value of any item or expression by the components of its meaning. According to Miller (2007, p.28), "The sense of an expression is that ingredient of its meaning which determines its semantic value". Miller adds that each expression has its own semantic properties in which the recognition of semantic values was built upon, and as a consequence senses come to existence. To clarify this assumption, Frege uses two expressions which are *the morning star* and *the evening star* both of which refer to a planet in the universe called *Venus*. For Frege, although both have the same referent, they cannot stand as synonyms of each other and cannot be replaced in different contexts, because each one represents this star in a different time of a day. Thus, each one has its own particular sense that is different from the other (Carl, 1994, p.27).

Based on Frege's identification of the notion of *sense*, Miller (2007, p. 29) states that "the sense of an expression is what someone who understands the expression grasps" and adds that "the sense of a complex expression is determined by the senses of its constituents". To prove his assumptions, Miller uses Frege's example *the morning star* and *the evening star* in which one can perceive the sense of any sentence if the sense of the sentence components are attained, and also possible to understand the sense of any sentence without being familiar with the truth value of the sentence. For example, in the sentence *the morning star* is *the evening star*, one can arrive at the sense of this sentence without knowing the truth value of the sentence (Miller, 2007, p.27).

Russell also elaborated on the notion of *sense*, and he figured out some shortcomings in Frege's perspectives. According to Miller (2007, p.72), Russell's critiques are represented in two main points. The first Russell's critique to the Frege's identification of *sense* is that "the distinction between sense and semantic value is actually incoherent". Russell's second critique is associated with the Frege's intention to solve some puzzles and non-clear

points with utilizing the notion of *sense* i.e. Russell believes that the proposition of the notion of *sense* by Frege is just to solve some problems that degrade the significance and the real status of the notion of *sense*. Miller (2007, p.72) clarifies that "Frege's introduction of sense is motivated by the desire to solve three main problems: the problem of bearingless names, the problem of substitution into belief contexts, and the problem of informativeness".

Frege admits that one would truly perceive the sense of any sentence if he or she was aware of the semantic value of its constituents, but Russell believes that the recognition of semantic value cannot always approve the truth condition of the sentence (Carl, 1994, p.27). For instance, for Frege, both phrases *the morning star* and *the evening star* have the same semantic value as they refer to the same object in the real world which is the planet *Venus* although they have different senses. Whereas, for Russell, although the phrases *the morning star* and *the evening star* have the same identification in the real word and refer to the same planet, they do not have the same semantic value. Thus, Russell proposes that the same entity cannot always have the same semantic value, and that the meaning of a sentence is not affected by only substituting the words or phrases that have the same semantic value. For example:

1. a. Charles III was born in London.

    b. The present king of England was born in London.

In the above sentences, for Russell, both *Charles III* and *the present king of England* refer to the same entity (person) and have the same semantic value; therefore, both sentences represent the same sense.

2.3 Meaning

Before considering the concept of meaning, it should be taken into consideration that language is a system of conventional signs and all its linguistic levels exist to serve the function of conveying meaning. The concept of *meaning* is one of the very complicated concepts that cannot be properly defined. Many sources are consulted to select a well-structured definition of *meaning* that can comprehensively represent it, but it has been deduced that due to the complexity of the concept and the diversity in the perspectives of philosophers,

scholars and linguists, it is very normal to have different definitions. Moreover, *meaning* is something abstract, so this trait makes *meaning* difficult to be examined. However, *meaning* by the majority of scholars has been taken as a general concept (Lyons, 1977, p.2). Therefore, to understand the notion of *meaning*, several definitions of this concept from different orientations are provided in this article aiming to identify it.

According to Nöth (1995, p. 91), *meaning* is a very complicated semiotic system on the basis of both theoretical and terminological aspects; in its broader content, it trespasses its restricted border in order to embrace *sense* and *reference* as well. Therefore, one can easily observe various definitions of *meaning* proposed by different meaning theories such as referential theories, sense theories, semantic theories and pragmatic theories of meaning (Allan, 1986, p.22). For instance, according to Nöth (1995), the majority of semanticists eliminate the portion of *reference* within the form of *meaning*. Nöth (1995, p.92) adds that "other theories are pluralist, taking both sense, reference, and possibly also other semiotic dimensions into account" in their definitions of the concept of meaning. Lyons (1977, p.3) states that the notion of *meaning*, in both philosophy of language and linguistics, is assigned as a comprehensive word to embrace the concepts of *reference* and *sense*. Moreover, there are still many linguists that ignore any sort of diversity and differences in differentiating meaning related concepts, particularly *meaning* and *sense*, from each other. For Quine (1981), Fattah (2020) and Fattah (2023) the notion of meaning cannot be identified, unless its concerned metaphorical assumptions and contextual influences are recognized.

There are many theories formulated to identify the notion of *meaning*, and the majority of these theories are founded on the basis of linguistic perspectives or language philosophy standpoints (Allan, 1986). Allan adds that mainly the theories of meaning are classified into two groups based on their assumptions on dealing with meaning: a group of theories discern meaning as an entity, whereas the other group identifies meaning in terms of connections between "entity and semiotic" (1986, p. 45).

Meaning is usually composed of reference and stereotype (Putnam, 1979). One of the basic components of *meaning* is *reference*; Putnam (1979, p. 215) believes that it is "fixed by meaning only in the sense of being a component of meaning, but not in the sense that meaning

is a mechanism for fixing reference". Based on this argument, it is the nature of the reference that shapes the meaning which the reference represents, whereas the meaning has no system or technique to approve the reference. For example, to make a distinction between silver and any other types of metal that looks like silver, it's the chemical nature of silver that recognize this metal as silver, and usually the procedure of recognizing silver can be fulfilled by considering some mechanisms by experts; and it is not the meaning that can give the identification to the concerned metal. The second component of meaning is 'stereotype' (Putnam, 1979, p. 215), which is defined as "sets of beliefs or idealized beliefs" connected with the references that are not regarded as a part of the reference but help to broaden the meaning of the reference. For example, the meaning of gold is always associated with many beliefs some of which are derived from the nature of gold and some from social perspectives about gold, such as purity, beauty, value, and many others.

For Green (2005, p.555), meaning is associated with conventional signs provided by human customs and agreements; and their acquisition, learning and understanding require special learning, skill as well as innate support, and may be different for different users. Moreover, Cruse (1990, p.79) associates the meaning of any word with the notion and the image to which it is connected. His assumption to the word meaning is similar to the consideration of meaning by *ideational theory* because ideational theory of meaning admits that there is no meaningful expression without being connected with a concept or an image.

 For referentialists, the meaning of a word or expression is connected with what it indicates in the real world, and the object that is denoted by a word is called referent. The referential theory of meaning is regarded as the earliest theory that gave insight into meaning; its appearance dates back to Plato's Cratylus. According to this theory, for example, the word tree is a signifier and the tree as object in the real word is signified and the link between them is direct (Lycan, 2008, p. 78).

For mentalists, meaning is maintained in coincidence with the relationship between words and things to raise a concept in the mind of interactants (Green, 2005). Mentalists' view of meaning is highly

represented in the *Ideational Theory* of meaning which is also labeled by some scholars as *Mentalistic Theory* of meaning. For the illustration of this theory, Ogden and Richards drew a semiotic triangle to illustrate the relation between the referent (object), the symbol (linguistic element) and thought (concept) (Green, 2005, p.355). Their triangle shows that the relation between the linguistic element and the object creates a type of reflection in the mind of interactants which is known as conception or thought. This view was rejected for many reasons, mainly, for the concept in the mind of individuals cannot be always successfully accessed to by the hearer while interacting, and their argument cannot be tested to verify.

Meaning is also the main focus for behaviorists as they try to eliminate the role of mental engagement in the determination of meaning. Behaviorists, such as Watson, Skinner and Bloomfield, associate language (including meaning) with the principle of "stimulus-response", as they believe that all our behavior (including language and meaning) result from external stimuli that can be clarified without considering the internal mental states. In general, behaviorists, namely Bloomfield, associate meaning with either the stimulus that evokes it or the response that it evokes, or the combination of both (Cruse, 1990, p.79). Thus, meaning is defined as the relation between speech and the physical response and it is no matter whether the speech (stimuli) precedes the response or vice versa. Behavioristic approach to meaning, like the other theories and assumptions of meaning, is criticized for its inability to cover the generality of the notion of meaning (Allan, 1986). For example, *sugar* is the name of the common use of a particular thing whereas it has a different chemical meaning. This and many other examples prove the inability of behaviorism in considering the notion of meaning successfully.

Meaning has also been examined in terms of context. For the contextual theory, meaning of linguistic elements depends on the contexts in which they are used. According to Laycan (2008, p.76), Malinowski and Firth are pioneers in associating meaning to context as they adopted the concept of *context of situation* to focus on the social functions of language, and to illustrate the role of context in determining the meaning of utterances. Thus,

this theory only concentrated on the context in which language is used, but ignored the contribution of mind, logic and rationality in the process of identifying meaning.

Deriving from what has been stated above, it can be concluded that all the above assumptions made in connection to meaning, whether by referentialists, mentalists, behaviorists or contextualists, result in some significant truth about the nature of language and meaning which is that meaning, thought, and language are interconnected and used by humans to express themselves. However, they all fail in determining the nature of language and meaning, and how they operate, because "none of them, on present evidence at any rate, has seemed to carry the seeds of fruitful research" (Cruse, 1990, p80).

To conclude, although many assumptions and theories have been proposed so far by philosophers and linguists to clarify the nature and the operation of the notion of *meaning*, no one could provide a satisfactory and a comprehensive clarification to this phenomenon. Thus, *meaning* is still regarded as a very complex phenomenon in human life.

2.4 A Boundary among Reference, Sense and Meaning

Although many studies shed light on the concepts of *reference*, *sense*, and *meaning*, none of them could draw a strict boundary among them. A kind of overlap and misconception is still observed in the sources in which they are considered. However, based on the above provided detailed information on each of the concept's *reference*, *sense* and *meaning* separately, it can be deduced that a boundary can be drawn among them as stated below.

1. The notion of *reference* is connected with the denotative meanings of the words that are provided in dictionaries; no matter, whether the *reference* refers to a tangible referent or an abstract one. For example, the referential meaning of the word flower is *the seed-bearing part of a plant which is typically surrounded by a brightly coloured corolla*. Regarding the referential meaning of an abstract word such as *beauty*, it is defined as *a combination of qualities that pleases the aesthetic senses, especially the sight*.

2. The notion of *sense* covers the conceptual meanings that are achieved based on the experiences of the user. The conceptual meanings of any word are kept in the mind, and they are available to be used in language construction and interpretation. Thus, the conceptual meanings of any word are categorized as the predictable meaning. For example, the word *flower* could stand for one of these conceptual meanings: *beauty*, *nice smell*, *nature*, *spring*, *a girl* or *a kid*. It is normal to have different conceptual meanings for the word *flower* because of the diversity in the interactants' experience and culture. For instance, for someone, the word flower can be used to stand for *a kid*, but for someone else might not.

3. The notion of *meaning* is concerned with the contextual meaning that is derived from the context in which it is used based on the contextual factors such as the setting, the topic, the register, the nature of relationship among interactants, the interactants' cultural, social, and religious background, etc. According to this elaboration, the meaning of any word is unknown, unless the context in which it is used is taken into consideration. For example, the meaning of the word *flower* is unknown without considering the context. The word flower could be used to stand for *a nice car*, could be used ironically to stand for *an ugly person or thing*, or stand for *an unpredicted thing* (concrete or abstract). Therefore, it can be deduced that it is the context that can determine the precise meaning of any word, and the contextual meaning is something unknown without considering the context.

2.5 Rhetorical Statements

Rhetorical statements are those statements that incorporate words and phrases in innovative and unexpected ways aiming at improving the process of communication with the enhancement of attention, persuasion and enjoyment as they usually convey the denotative meaning of the enrolled words. According to Yankah (1994, p.3568), "rhetoric refers to the art of oratory, or persuasive speaking – the art of effective argumentation to influence opinion". Moreover, Dave (2008) states that rhetoric is connected to the use of language creatively and effectively in both spoken and written discourse with utilizing effective words and phrases. Rhetorical statements are of different forms such as metaphor, hyperbole, irony, paradox, juxtaposition, etc., and the process of their translation is tough.

Difficulty in the interpretation is one of the essential traits by which the rhetorical statements are recognized. Translators generally face difficulty in arriving at the precise interpretation of rhetorical statements, and consequently they struggle in providing precise definitions of them.

3. METHODOLOGY

This study used a qualitative approach to answer the raised questions. It is qualitative to determine the role of translators' familiarity with *reference*, *sense* and *meaning* in conducting the process of translation successfully.

3.1. Data Collection

The data were collected in two successive stages:

1. This study utilized five rhetorical statements used by English novelists in their works. The selection of the employed rhetorical statements was based on their length and diversity.
2. The translated rhetorical statements by the participants (translators) before their familiarity with the notion of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning*, and the translated rhetorical statements by the participants after familiarity with the notions of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning*.

3.2. The Participants

The participants were twenty English-to-Kurdish/Kurdish-to-English translators with experience in translating texts of different registers from English to Kurdish and vice versa. Their translation experience ranged from 9- 18 years. However, they were not familiar with the notions of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning* when they were first recruited for this study.

3.3. The Procedures

1. Five rhetorical statements were selected based on their nature, topic, length and diversity.

2. The translators who, at this stage, were not familiar with the notion of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning* were asked to translate the selected rhetorical statements.

3. Based on the similarities and differences of the translated versions, two to four versions out of the twenty versions were selected.

4. The notion of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning* were introduced to the engaged translators illustrating how these notions were differentiated from one another, and how they could be incorporated into the translation of the rhetorical statements.

5. The recruited translators were asked to translate the same rhetorical statements that they translated before being familiar with the notion of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning*.

6. After collecting all the versions of the translation, dissimilar ways of translations (ranged from 3 to 5) were selected and sent back to the translators to select the most appropriate version of translation.

4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

In this section, the study illustrates how the rhetorical statements were translated from English into Kurdish by the translators while they were not familiar with a boundary among the notion of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning*. Then, the translated rhetorical statements were compared to the translations of the same rhetorical statements done by the same translators after being informed and made familiar with the boundary among *reference*, *sense* and *meaning*. This procedure was helpful to figure out how the translators' familiarity with and awareness of these notions were incorporated to the translation of rhetorical statements.

One of the rhetorical statements that were translated by the translators was this statement:

1. "....it was the age of wisdom; it was the age of foolishness." (Charles Dickens- *A Tale of Two Cities*)

Before being familiar with the boundary among *reference*, *sense* and *meaning*, from all the twenty translations done by the translators, the two versions below were, to a great extent, representing all of them.

a) ئەوسەردەمە سەردەمی ژیری بوو. ئەو سەردەمە سەردەمی گەمژایەتی بوو.

b) ئەوه رۆژگاری ژیری بوو، ئەوه رۆژگاری گەمژایەتی بوو.

The majority of the translators provided the referential translation of the rhetorical statements. They translated *the age of wisdom* and *the age of foolishness* to سەردەمی گەمژایەتی and سەردەمی ژیری respectively. These

contradictory phrases are not understandable to Kurdish readers unless they have some background knowledge about them. This statement was written in a period when England was facing an incredible development in terms of science, literature, industry and education. Moreover, that period was recognized by the dominance of ignorance, irrationality, and stupidity among the young generations, a part of the elite people who led the development of society. The coexistence of development and foolishness at the same period is something absent and sounds unusual in the Kurdish society and the translators, at their first attempt, did not incorporate the reasons behind raising these contradictory statements by the writer. However, in their second attempt, after being familiarized with the boundary among *reference*, *sense* and *meaning*, the majority of the participants have given a deeper insight into the translation and they selected the version below as the most appropriate form of the translation:

- ئەگەرچی ئەم سەردەمە سەردەمی ژیری بوو لە ولاتدا ، سەردەمی پەرەسەندنی گەمژایەتیشبوو لە نێو خەلکدا.

  - Although it was the age of wisdom in the country, it was also the age of foolishness among people.

In the above translation, the participants translated the employed rhetorical statement with adding some certain information such as (لە ولاتدا= in the country, لە نێو خەلکدا = among people) in the target language in order to be understood by readers. For instance, *the age of wisdom* is translated as 'سەردەمی ژیری بوو لە ولاتدا= the age of wisdom in the country', and *the age of foolishness* is translated by the majority participants as (سەردەمی پەرەسەندنی گەمژایەتی بوو لە نێو خەلکدا = the age of prevailing foolishness among people).

In fact, the participants in their first attempt of translating the rhetorical statement resorted to the referential meaning of the statement without considering its conceptual and contextual meaning. However, in their second attempt, they resorted to the context of the rhetorical statement in order to do an understandable translation of the statement. Thus, in the first attempt, the translations were conducted at the levels of reference, but in the second attempt, they were done at the level of meaning.

2. "It was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking thirteen." (George Orwell-*1984*)

First translation attempts of statement (2) made by the translators are generally represented in the following four ways.

a) لە رۆژێکی ساردی درەوشاوەی مانگی چواردا، کاتژمێرەکان سێزده زەنگیان لێدا.

b) لە رۆژێکی ساردی گەشاوەی مانگی نەورۆزدا ، کاتژمێرەکان سێزده جارزەنگیان لێدا.

c) رۆژێکی سارد و خۆرەتاوی مانگی گولان بوو، هەروەها کاتژمێرەکان سێزدا جار زەنگیان لێدابوو.

d) رۆژێکی سارد و خۆرەتاوی مانگی نیسان بوو، هەروەها کاتژمێرەکان سێزدا جار زەنگیان لێدابوو.

From all the twenty attempts of translations made by the translators, the above four different forms of translation were selected to represent all of them. These four forms of translation made use of both *reference* (the denotative meaning that is provided in dictionary), and *sense* (the conceptual meanings). For instance, the word *April*, in the above translated forms, is translated in different ways.

i. April in version (a) is translated as مانگی چوار (The fourth month), and this is the referential meaning of April.

ii. April in version (b) is translated as مانگی نەورۆز = Newroz (the first month of the Kurdish year starting from March 21st to April 20th).

iii. In version (c), April is translated as مانگی گولان = Gullan (the second month in the Kurdish Year starting from April 21st to May 20th).

Moreover, some of the translators translated April as مانگی نیسان = Nissan' (Nissan is the fourth month of the Gregorian calendar, and it is commonly used by Arabs and Kurds) as in version (d). These translations are representative of the conceptual meaning that the translators had based on their experience related to the meaning of April.

In fact, the translators faced difficulty in translating the word *April* to Kurdish because of the dissimilarity between the Kurdish calendar and the Gregorian calendar. The first 21 days in April is located in Gullan,

and the last 9 days of April is located in Newroz based on the Kurdish calendar. Therefore, the translators were confused with the use of Kurdish date; instead, some of them used *fourth month* and some others used Nissan (An Arabic word for the word April in Gregorian calendar). However, none of them took context into consideration in translating words like *bright*, *cold* and the climate of the UK.

However, after getting familiar with the boundary among the notions of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning*, the translators translated the statement in a different way. For example, the majority of them (75%) translated the word April as *saratay bahar = the beginning of spring or the early spring* making use of the two modifiers *bright* and *cold* that preceded the word *April* in the statement taking into consideration the climate of the location where this rhetorical statement is generated.

Another apparent problem observed in the translation of the above selected rhetorical statement is *the clocks were striking thirteen times*. All the engaged translators provided the referential translation of this statement translating it as کاتژمێرەکان سێزده جار زەنگیان لێدا. This literal translation does not make sense to Kurdish people because the striking of clocks at every hour is not a part of Kurdish culture. However, striking clocks every hour in the UK society symbolizes the natural order of life indicating that everything is going well, while striking thirteen times represents the departure to an abnormal system of life in a way that time is extending. The extension of time symbolizes the annoyance and boredom felt by oppressed societies. Thus, the translators could not convey this feeling in their translations as they could not go beyond the referential meaning of the words used in this statement.

However, after familiarizing the translators with the boundary among the notions of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning*, they translated *the clocks were striking thirteen times* in a way different from their first attempt. The majority of the translators tried to include the feeling of abnormality and distortion of life by adding a phrase like *unlike normal days*. This time, the translators translated the statement as:

- جیاواز له رۆژانی ئاساییدا، کاتژمێرەکان سێزده جار زەنگیان لێدا.

The purpose behind adding the phrase جیاواز له رۆژانی ئاساییدا = unlike normal days' is to tell the Kurdish readers that striking clock thirteen times symbolizes that the coming days will be abnormal, unstable and frustrating. Thus, 'the clocks were striking thirteen' means those abnormal days are heading. The translators have figured out that adding the phrase جیاواز له رۆژانی ئاساییدا = *unlike normal days* is essential to be added while translating the considered rhetorical statements. Thus, the translation of the rhetorical statement by the participants in their second attempt illustrated below:

After collecting all the versions of the translation of the rhetorical statement '*It was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking thirteen*', the translators were asked to select the most appropriate one, and they selected the following version of translation.

- له رۆژێکی ساماڵ و ساردی سەرەتای بەهاردا، جیاواز له رۆژانی ئاساییدا، کاتژمێرەکان سێزده جار زەنگیان لێدا.
  - In a bright cold day of early spring, unlike the normal days, the clocks struck thirteen times.

3. "It was as if the world were a great orchestra, and she but a single note." (Thomas Wolfe-*You Can't Go Home Again*)

Although twenty translators were enrolled to translate this rhetorical statement, the translations were, to a great extent, similar to each other except for some insignificant differences. The version below represents all the twenty versions of translation done by the participants.

- وەك ئەوەی جیهان ئۆرکێسترایەکی گەورە بێت و ئەویش تەنها نۆتەیەك بێت.

All the translations that are provided by the participants have come up with the referential translation of the rhetorical statement. In other words, the participants used the denotative meaning of each word that constitutes the rhetorical statement. For example, the key words *world, orchestra* and *note* in the considered rhetorical statement are translated into their denotative meanings. Thus, this translation might cause misunderstanding to Kurdish readers.

However, the majority of the participants, in their second attempt of translation after being introduced to the boundaries among *reference*, *sense* and *meaning*, have

agreed upon the below translation of the rhetorical statement:

- ژیان سیستهمێکی فراوانی ئاڵۆز و بههیهکهوهبهستراوه، ئهویش لهم سیستهمهدا تهنیا کهسێکی ئاساییه.

- Life is a wide harmonious complicated system, and she is just a small futile person in this system.

It seems that the majority of the participants in their second attempt have returned to the original text in which the rhetorical statement is used. The participants made use of the context including the text, the writer's intention, the thematic meaning of the statement, their own cultural and educational backgrounds and all other influencing factors on the considered statement. In the second attempt, the translators translated *world* as ژیان (life), great orchestra as سیستهمێکی فراوانی ئاڵۆز و بههیهکهوهبهستراو (A wide harmonious complicated system), and a single note as کهسێکی ئاساییه (A normal person). Thus, the participants had only resorted to the referential meaning in their first attempt whereas they resorted to the conceptual and contextual meanings in their second attempt.

4. "All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others." (George Orwell-*Animal Farm*)

Among all the twenty versions provided by translators, the two following versions represented all the translations done by the translators.

a) ههموو ئاژهڵان یهکسانن، بهڵام ههندێ له ئاژهڵان لهوانی تر یهکسانترن.
- All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.

b) ههموو ئاژهڵان یهکسانن له مافدا، ههندێ له ئاژهڵان یهکسانترن له مافهکانیاندا.
- All animals are equal in their rights, but some animals are more equal in their rights.

In their first attempt, the participants resorted to the referential translation (reference) of the considered statement as shown in version (a) above, whereas some of the participants could to some extent derive the conceptual meaning (sense) of the statement as given in version (b). However, after familiarizing the participants with the boundary among the notions *reference*, *sense*, *meaning*, the participants provided different versions of

the translation which are recognized by considering the contextual meaning.

In their translation, generally, the participants translated similar component words in the rhetorical statement differently as clarified below:

i. some animals = ئاژهڵهبههێزهکان (the powerful animals)

ii. more equal = بوێرترن له بهدهستهێنانی مافهکانیان دا (are more assertive in seeking their rights)

Among the twenty versions of translations, three versions represented all the twenty versions and were sent back to the translators to select the most appropriate version among them.. The translators generally agreed upon the following version of translation as the most suitable one.

b) ههموو ئاژهڵان یهکسانن له مافدا، بهڵام ههندێ له ئاژهڵان بوێرترن له بهدهستهێنانی مافهکانیاندا.
- All animals are equal in their rights, but some animals are more assertive in seeking their rights.

The above translations of the key words in the considered rhetorical statements prove that the participants went back to the original text in which the considered rhetorical statement was located in order to use the context to translate it. Thus, in the second attempt, the participants avoided the employment of reference and sense of the key words; instead, they went to the exact meaning of the words.

5. "We are all in the gutter, but some of us are looking at the stars." (Oscar Wilde-Lady Windermere's Fan)

The above rhetorical statement is the last one that was employed to be translated by the participants before their familiarity with the boundary among the notions of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning*. In their first attempt, the following two forms of translations represented all the versions.

a) ئێمه ههمومان له ههمان زهڵکاو داین، بهڵام ههندێکمان سهیری ئهستێرهکان دهکهین.
- We are all in the same gutter, but some of us are looking at the stars.

b) ئێمه هەمومان له هەمان گرفت داین، بەڵام هەندێکمان سەیری ئەستێرەکان دەکەین.

- We are all having the same problem, but some of us are looking at the stars.

Version (a) in the first attempt of translation is a referential translation as all the words are referentially translated into Kurdish utilizing the denotative meaning of each word in the rhetorical statement. Nevertheless, some other participants, in addition to the referential translation, used conceptual translation as in version (b). For instance, the expression *gutter* is translated to زەڵکاو = *problem*. Thus, it can be deduced that the participants in their first attempt incorporated *sense* (conceptual meaning) in addition to the referential meaning. However, after familiarizing the participants with the boundary among the notions of *reference*, *sense* and *meaning*, the majority of the participants selected the below version of translation as the most suitable one.

a) ئێمه هەمومان له هەمان گرفت داین، بەڵام هەندێکمان به ئومێدەوه له داهاتوودا دەڕوانین.

- We are facing the same problem, but some of us are looking up the future with hope.

In the second attempt, the participants employed the notion of *meaning* in their translation as they resorted to the contextual meaning of the considered rhetorical statement. For example, the participants translated the key words and phrases as they are stated below:

i. We are all in the same gutter = هەمان له هەمومان ئێمه داین گرفت (We are in the same problem)

ii. Some of us looking at the stars = به هەندێکمان دەڕوانین داهاتوودا له ئومێدەوه (Some of us looking up the future with hope)

The above translation of the two key phrases in the considered rhetorical statements proves that the participants made use of the contextual meaning in the process of translation. Thus, in the second attempt, the participants avoided the employment of reference and sense of the key words and phrases instead they went to the contextual meaning of them.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The most significant concluding points that have been derived from this study are:

1. The translation of rhetorical statements is a very challenging process.

2. There are three levels of translation which are referential translation, conceptual translation and contextual translation.

3. Unfamiliarity of translators with a boundary among the reference (referential meaning), sense (conceptual meaning) and meaning (contextual meaning) usually leads to inappropriate translation of rhetorical statements.

4. Some key words and phrases in rhetorical statements could be only precisely translated with the use of contextual meaning.

5. Translators' familiarity with the boundary among the notions of reference, sense and meaning is helpful to conduct the process of translating rhetorical statements precisely.

6. Kurdish translators mostly resort to *reference* (referential meaning) and *sense* (conceptual meaning), but they can rarely arrive at the contextual meaning while translating the rhetorical statements.

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