Dimensions of Implication:
A Review of the Saying-Meaning-Implying Trichotomy

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ABSTRACT

Grice's distinction between what is said and what is implicated in the theory of Conversational Implicature is a sketchy proposal, because what is said is quite complex and is the main source of controversy among the philosophers of language and linguists. This article aims at reviewing the modern theories of meaning. Semanticists, linguists and language philosophers have posited meaning in various dichotomies: sentence meaning / utterance meaning; sentence meaning/ speaker meaning; saying / implying, implicature/ explicature; implicature/ entailment; implicature/presupposition; implicature/ enrichment; implicature/ inference. These meaning dichotomies have failed to address the question of whether or not implication should be recognized as a two-way process or a three-way process. In Grice's theory, 'what is said' can be envisaged in two more distinctions: 'what is said versus what is implicated', and 'what is said versus what is meant.' Moreover, after the establishment of the implicature notion, some linguists and language philosophers argued for additional terms to account for other aspects of pragmatic inferences that implicature theory has failed to recover. In conclusion, it is believed that the traditional account of meaning dichotomy, which is between what is said and what is implicated, is better substituted with trichotomy: what is said, what is meant, and what is implicated.

KEY WORDS: Meaning Dichotomies, Trichotomies, What is Implied, What is Meant, What is Said

1.   INTRODUCTION:

In the late 1950s, linguistics began to take interest in the exploration of performance phenomena, key thinkers and philosophers such as Grice (1975), Peter Strawson, John Searle (1969) and Ludwig Wittgenstein had made seminal contributions into the field. It was within the ordinary language philosophy, Austin and Grice in particular, had developed theories of Speech Act and Conversational Implicature respectively.

According to Chapman (2011) modern pragmatics as a phrase is used for the latter approaches to pragmatics which had emerged due to problems with Austin's explanation of the distinction between 'meaning' and the 'force' of an utterance. Moreover, Grice's *what is said* was never fully developed so the exact starting point for the maxims to produce *what is implicated* was not clear. According to Huang (2014) the foundational theory of Conversational Implicature by Grice was prone to a great number of reinterpretations, revisions and refinements.

The cooperative principle and its constituent maxims have been subject to various attempts of reduction. The Hornian two-principled and the Levinsonian three-principled Neo-Gricean theories are considered as the most influential reductionist approaches to implicature. However, none of these theories are in any way deemed to be a direct update of or substitute for Gricean Implicature theory. The Neo-Griceans do not necessarily adopt Grice's specific terminology and disagree with him to some extent. Nonetheless, they retain the notion of 'Implicatures' and their work can be identified within the Gricean framework.

Grice (1989) argues that conversational implicatures rise due to the assumption that the maxims are being preserved at least at essential levels. Distinction can be made between what a speaker has said through

conventional meaning of the words and what a speaker conversationally implicates by saying those words. The driving force behind Grice's theory of implicature was the fact that he was convinced that what we literally say and what we intend to convey by these words differ dramatically. This distinction between different layers of a single utterance was first presented by Austin.

Austin (1962) claims that when someone says something three different acts, which are all constituent parts of the same single speech act, take place simultaneously. The three layers are *locution*, *illocution* and *perlocution*. The first level is normally paired with the abstract or literal meaning of sentence meaning. The second category is compared with the implied meaning of an utterance. The latter category does not only have meaning but also force. Thomas (1995) states that in pragmatics, force is equated with communicative intention of the speaker. Austin is credited for laying the foundation of pragmatics and recognizing the different layers of meaning in a single utterance. However, his explanation of meaning was rather limited due to covering only speech acts. Indirection and nonliteral meaning, and tropes are the vast areas of meaning which were left untreated by speech act theory but theory of implicature was designed to respond to such issues.

Implicature is the additional or/and different meaning conveyed by the speaker. Russell and Graff Fara (2012) say that both words and speakers mean things and this meaning is not the same thing. Divergence of linguistic meaning and speaker meaning in using words is a commonplace in everyday language use; nonliteral language, metaphors, hyperbole, simile, and indirect speech acts are prominent representatives of such uses. Furthermore, tautology is another phenomenon of language that can clearly embody this gap. Example (1)

(1)   A hamburger is a hamburger.

Is an answer given by a woman to a man during their lunch break when the man asks the woman to express her opinion about the hamburger. From a logical perspective the answer rendered by the woman does not have any communicative value. The hamburger example and other apparently meaningless utterances like *business is business* or *boys will be boys* are called tautologies. The occurrence of tautologies in interaction triggers the fact that the speaker intends to communicate more than is said (Yule, 1996).

From the hearers' perspective, these utterances need to be deciphered. Thomas (1995, p. 58) shows how an implicature is 'generated intentionally by the speaker and may (or may not) be understood by the hearer'. While an inference is the production act of the hearer on the basis of available evidence and may not be the same as what the speaker intends. Archer, Aijmer and Wichmann (2012, p. 48) also state that 'implicature and

inference are not a feature of the words themselves but of interlocutors' intents and interpretations.' Therefore, a hearer's inference may not be identical as the speaker's intended implicature.

To illustrate this mismatch between intended implicature and the hearer's inference, the following example (2) is from the movie, 51st state, practically projects this case. A character called Felix De Sousa had told his gangster member, Frederick, to 'take care of Laurence, the chemist.' But when De Sousa opens the trunk of his car, he finds the body of the chemist! Confused, De Sousa asks Frederick 'what happened?'

(2a) Frederick: You told me to take care of him

(2b) De souse: Oh, Shit! I meant to take care of him, not fucking take care of him!

Adopted form (Archer, Aijmer and Wichmann, 2012, P.48)

The above example is interesting because the addresser and the addressee have different meanings and interpretations of the phrase *take care of him* and the reason is the phrase has two possible meanings. The addressee has chosen the one (i.e., kill him). Looking into the gangster life style Frederick chose the most likely meaning while it is the wrong meaning.

1. Meaning dichotomies

There have been a variety of meaning distinctions starting with the basic distinction of literal vs. non-literal meaning, implicit vs. explicit meaning, sense vs. reference, etc. However, the meaning distinctions referred to in this article subsume dichotomies that are ramifications of the implicature theory. These include: sentence meaning / utterance meaning; sentence meaning / speaker meaning; saying / implying, implicature / explicature; implicature / entailment; implicature / presupposition; implicature / enrichment; and implicature / inference.

2.1 Sentence meaning / utterance meaning

Sentence meaning includes those aspects of meaning that are abstract and totally independent of any concrete form. Sentence meaning is compositional, that is, it is made up of the total meaning of its constituent parts. Semantics studies sentence meaning because sentences are abstract linguistic structures and they do not have context, producers and hearers. Sentences are naturally characterized for being written or spoken, grammatically correct, and express a complete thought (Birner, 2013). On the other hand, utterance meaning is the employment of a particular piece of language, i.e., a word, a phrase, a sentence or a sequence of sentences by a particular speaker, in a particular place, time and event.

The study of utterance meaning is the concern of pragmatics because an utterance has certain properties such as: it should be uttered by a person at a specific time, location and event, which are not shared by the

sentence. Whereas, sentences are governed by linguistic rules of grammar, deviation from grammatical rules by any certain string of words can be described as incomplete or ungrammatical. While it is normal to have meaningful utterances out of incomplete sentences, people do not often talk in complete sentences. Another significant difference between sentence meaning and any particular occurrences of that sentence is that the utterance possesses spatio-temporal and physical characteristics, while these features are absent in the sentence. This is clearly illustrated in the given example:

(3) I will see you here tomorrow.

It can be assumed that a particular utterance of the sentence is occurred at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday 24 may 2010 in a lecturer's office that it was uttered by Mr. Smith and that he produced it in a low and quiet voice. We could say of another utterance of the same sentence that it occurred at 8:30 p.m. on Monday 24 August 2010 in the blue pub, that was spoken by Matt Jones and he shouted at the top of his voice. Meaning differences of the two instances of the utterances are not shared by the sentence. Utterances are licensed to assign meaning to deictic expressions as in 'I' refers to Mr. Smith in the first utterance and to Matt jones in the second, 'here' refers to Mr. Smith's office or to the Blue Pub, and that 'tomorrow' refers to Wednesday 25 May or Tuesday 25 August 2010. Moreover, Mr. Smith said the utterance with the intention of an order to a troublesome student, while Matt Jones intended his utterance as a promise to his friend. Issuing and order and making a promise are not semantic properties of the above sentence. They are pragmatic properties of specific utterances of the sentence.

2.2 Sentence meaning / speaker meaning

Sentence meaning is the literal meaning of a sentence which is derived from the sense of the constituent words and the syntax that combines them. On the other hand, speaker meaning is the meaning that a speaker intends to convey, partially, by the means of literal meaning of the sentence (Carston, 2002). There is often divergence between the meaning of linguistic expression a speaker uses and the meaning he intends to communicate by using it, that is, the intention of the speaker in using such a sentence goes well beyond and above the literal meaning of the sentence. For example, when someone asks you to go to the movies with him and you say:

(4) I am tired.

The linguistic meaning of what you said is just that you are tired. *I*, *am*, and *tired* are taken literally and combined into a sentence together will provide you the simple meaning that you are tired. However, you are likely to have conveyed more than you literally said. You most likely conveyed an additional meaning which goes beyond and above the literal meaning of the sentence. The communicated meaning based on the

given context could convey that you do not want to go to the movies with that particular individual. Although the speakers' intentions and what they literally say do not line up, they still hope to have hearers to recognize their communicated meaning. The first level of the sentence meaning is the literal meaning of the sentence *I am tired.*

The second level is the speaker meaning which means *I do not want to go to the movies with you*. The first meaning is called linguistic, literal meaning which is attached directly to the meaning of the words in question. The second meaning is speaker meaning, that is, non-conventional meaning, and it is not attached to the meaning of the words *I am tired*. Speaker meaning varies based on different contexts, for example, if the speaker uses the same group of words with same syntactic order 'I am tired' but in a different context, i.e., late at night to a friend or family member, he most likely intends that he wants to go to bed (Hurford, Heasley, and Smith, 2007).

2.3 Saying / meaning

In pragmatics, it is widely known that there is disparity between what a person says and what he means. There is often a divergence between the meaning of the linguistic expression one uses and the meaning they try to communicate by using it. According to Allan and Jaszczolt (2012) the notion of *saying* and its correlative notion *what is said* get involved in this distinction because a speaker can say one thing while meaning something else. He could mean something instead of what he says, or he could mean something in addition to what he says. In fact, a speaker can say something without meaning anything at all, as in recitation or translation. Grice (1989, p. 25) writes about the sense of *say* "I intend what someone has said to be closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) he has uttered." Basically, Grice uses the term to represent only the logical form of the sentence which is not fully propositional even in his own sense. In his own account to provide a fully propositional utterance, Grice dictates three requirements to be in place to attain the full proposition which are: *disambiguation*, *refence assignment* and *deictic fixing*. The extent of the gap between saying and meaning is manifested in some linguistic phenomena.

Carston (2002) presents a range of phenomena that embody such a gap and the most straight forward example is the case of irony. Irony is characterized as saying one thing while meaning the opposite. Figurative uses of language, in general, clearly instantiate the saying/ meaning distinction. *Metaphor*, *metonymy*, and *hyperbole* involve one thing so as to communicate something else. The first class of cases which show such disparity between saying and meaning can be gathered under the umbrella term of non -literality; here what is

said is merely a vehicle to convey what is meant. Another group of cases is that where the traces of what is said is found in what is meant but subtly. So, this constitution of what is meant by the elements of what is said is only partial and does not make the main point of the utterance. This second group cases comprises *Similes*, *understatements* and *Indirect answers*. In addition, the situation is even more complicated if utterances with incomplete sentences considered. In naturally occurring language use, utterances consist of partial or incomplete sentences. Employment of sub- sentential linguistic expression by utterances is another case of manifestation of the divergence. Using a prepositional phrase or a single word utterance demonstrates the distinction. The utterance in (5a) employs just a prepositional phrase and the one in (5b) just a single word, an adjective. On the face value, these two utterances do not provide enough information and seemingly unintelligible, but with the help of the context what is meant by the speaker in both cases is something propositional.

> *(5) a. On the top shelf!*
>   *b. Higher!*

Examples (5a) and (5b) embody the aforementioned cases: number (a) is a sub-sentential prepositional phrase is uttered by the speaker who realizes that the hearer, making breakfast, is looking for the marmalade, it communicates" the marmalade is on the top shelf." It may also have a variety of intended implications: the marmalade does not belong on the bottom shelf, I have moved it to its proper place, I am not trying to hide it form you, etc., (Carston, 2002, p. 17).

2.4 Natural / non-natural meaning

It is known that language is used to express meaning, but it is hard to define meaning. The major problem that arises in determining meaning is that there are several levels of meaning. Grice (1957, 1989) observed that meaning is not a unified notion but it has different levels and dimensions. He distinguishes between two senses of the expression (means) *natural and non-natural* meaning. Natural meaning is also called *indicator meaning*, while non-natural meaning is called *communicative meaning*. Natural meaning is the kind of meaning that is something has it when it is natural or symptom of or evidence for something. Natural meaning depends on a law like relations in the world. The following example is taken from Grice (1989, p.211):

> *(6) a- Those spots mean measles.*
>   *b- Black clouds mean rain.*

In (6) the relationship between the spots and having measles is a natural correlation. Namely, the spots act as evidence for having measles. The spots are direct indicators of being the case, having measles. The same explanation applies to the case of the relation between black clouds and rain. The natural relationship between black clouds and rain indicates the fact that the presence of black clouds brings along the fact of subsequent rain without prior set up with the intention of the former convey the presence of the latter. These relationships are natural and independent of the conventions and speaker's beliefs and intentions. In cases of natural meaning, there is entailment, that is, if x naturally means that p; then p must be the case. Error is impossible in natural meaning.

On the other hand, non- natural meaning (Meaning$_{nn)}$ is a type of meaning which is distinct from linguistic expressions. There is no immediate, automatic natural connection between the word and its meaning. The correlation between the word and its meaning is arbitrary. That is, the relation between the word and its meaning is not founded based on natural relationship between the sound and the meaning. This relationship, being arbitrary, could have ended up being linked to another cluster of sounds. This type of meaning is established on the fact that we as a society have agreed to arbitrarily connect the sound with the meaning in order to use the sound intentionally to generate the meaning. Non-natural meaning is a type of meaning that is successfully transmits the intention of the speaker. It can always be prone to error because human intentions and beliefs are normally error-laden. The interesting characterization of non-natural meaning is that it will not reach the level of satisfaction or achievement unless it is recognized by the addressee. Example

> *(7) Supercilious means arrogant and disdainful.*

In (7), there is a clear intention that the word supercilious be taken to mean arrogant and disdainful. Someone who uses this word intends that the correlation between the word and its meaning to be recognized as such.

According to Levinson (2000, p,13) Grice divides non-natural meaning into a range of different genera and species of meaning:

Genera and species of Meaning

Total signification of an utterance

What is said   What is implicated

Conventionally   Conversationally

Particularized   Generalized

2.5 Conversational / conventional implicature

Conversational implicature's contribution to the meaning of utterances is not truth conditional, that is, even if it turned out that the implicature did not hold the statement would not be affected truth conditionally. It also does not depend on the conventional meaning of the words used but, on the principles, concerning how people use language in general. Knowledge of language suffices to apprehend the meaning of both *what is said* and *what is conventionally implicated*, nonetheless, knowledge about language use such as context of the utterance, shared background knowledge and expectations and assumptions of interlocutors need to be supplemented to attain the full meaning of what has been additionally communicated through an utterance. *What is said* feeds into a hearer's interpretation of *what is implicated*, partially, therefore, the addressee needs to entertain the assumption that the speaker in the first place is adhering to the general principle of language use and take into account various aspects required for the calculation of the extra meaning conveyed through the utterance.

According to Mey (2001) understanding what people mean requires interpretation of what they say but interpretation is not always an accurate and precise procedure, misunderstandings are likely in conversation. Leech (1983) states that interpretation of an utterance is a guesswork; deciphering or/and guessing even with the help of semantic content will not work unless it is calculated in relation to specific circumstances, the persons involved and their background. Therefore, knowledge of context enhances the chance of successful guesswork. The primary reason for interlocutors to be qualified guessers has a lot to do with the fact that they share common context. The following example is and exchange between two interlocutors, it shows observance of maxims on the part of the speaker.

(8) (a) I am out of petrol
     (b) There is a garage round the corner.

In this example, there is an obvious unstated connection between (8a)'s and (8b)'s remarks. Although, this unstated intention is not part of the literal meaning of (8b)'s utterance; all that being said by (b) is that there is a garage round the corner. So, the meaning that the garage is one that is open and sells petrol is a conversational implicature. This meaning is inferred by the addressee based on the assumption that the speaker is adhering to the maxim of relation. To violate is to fail to observe one or more maxims, the speaker may choose to disregard them. The maxims are not rules, but they are conventional norms. The speaker produces an utterance based on the assumption that the hearer will not be able to realize that the speaker makes a false claim. The most obvious example of violating is lying.

The purpose of lying is deception and it is achieved through disregarding a particular maxim. Consider the following sentence:

(9) War is war

Is a tautology, superficially makes no sense or very little sense to the addressee. Here, the maxim of quantity is blatantly breached; however, the addressee preserves the assumption that the speaker is actually cooperative and has to find out why the speaker has made an obvious uninformative utterance. The only way to find out the folded meaning is to interpret the utterance as highly informative as possible by going above and beyond the literal meaning of the words in search for the invisible and richer intended meaning which is communicated through conversational implicature that includes the assumption of shared knowledge about the nature of wars and the calamities wars bring along.

Lastly, a speaker voluntarily decides to opt out of cooperative principle. In such a case, it is unlike violating and flouting, there is no intention to mislead or deceive and/or the intention to disregard a maxim to give rise to a conversational implicature. Rather, the speaker clearly demonstrates that he/she will not be adhering to one or more maxims because some more compelling issues overriding cooperation. A widely used response in cases of political scandals given by politicians encountering journalists would be one of the followings:

(10) No comment.

(11) I have nothing to say on this matter.

In each of the above cases, the speaker explicitly indicates unwillingness to observe a maxim, in this situation the maxim of Quantity. On the other hand, Grice's (1975) classification of types of meaning includes another form of implicature which is distinct from what is said but depends on the actual meaning of the words used. Conventional implicature is a property of a limited group of words, when they are deployed, they give rise to this form of implicature. Another distinctive characterization of conventional implicature is that they do not require calculation based on the maxims and the context of use; in other words, they are context-independent and they are attached to a certain linguistic expression. The conventional implicature generated in example (12 a)

(12) a- He is an Englishman, he is, therefore, brave.
     b- He is an Englishman; he is brave.

through the presence of adverb therefore. This adverb introduces the implicature that the referent of he is brave as a result of the fact that he is English. Contrary to example (10 a) example (10 b) does not establish such a relationship between the two parts of the statement and therefore no implicature is induced. The "as a consequence" meaning of therefore is not part of what is

said but an implicature because it is not an element of the truth conditional meaning of the utterance.

2.6 What is said / what is implicated

Grice (1975, 1989) divided the total signification of an utterance into what is said and what is implicated. What is said based on Gricean tradition includes: (i) the conventional meaning of a sentence uttered minus conventional implicatures (ii) the truth conditional propositional content of the sentence uttered. In contrast, what is conversationally implicated does not involve the encoded structure but rather inferred and calculated on the basis of what is said and rational nature of conversational interaction as stipulated in the cooperative principle and its component maxims of conversation. In the processes of meaning derivation what is said is expected to provide input to extract and recover what is conversationally implicated. However, to recover what is said, according to Grice (1989, p 25). The propositional content of what is said is not fully worked out, so one has to assign references, resolve indexicals and disambiguate expressions and this can be attained through linguistic and contextual decoding. as exemplified in the following examples:

(13) John told Bill that he wanted to date his sister.
       Preferred interpretation: he = john, his = Bill's
(14) Mary: How do I look?
(15) John: You look really cool.
Preferred Interpretation: I, You= Mary

    (16)   *a. the plant would enhance the view.*
Plant: Living organism such as a flower

      b. *the plant would destroy the view.*   Plant: factory   (Lexical ambiguity)

According to Birner (2013) understanding what someone meant by what they said requires more than just knowing the meanings of the words (semantics) and how the words are combined together into a sentence (syntax) because the code offers only a blueprint; communicative participants have to work together to build real meanings. It is essential to know the person who uttered the sentence and in what context. Such knowledge enables the listener to make inferences about why they said it and what they intended us to understand. For example, *there is a can of Pepsi left* can be understood as an offer "would you like it" or a warning "It is mine". People often mean a lot more than they say explicitly, and it is up to the addressees to work out what additional meaning is intended or conveyed. What is said is the literal meaning; the additional meaning is the implied meaning. The former is the domain of semantics while the latter is the domain of pragmatics.

Grice's presentation of theory of Implicature is deemed as a sketchy proposal. Grice made the distinction between what is said and what is implicated. However, "what is said" is quite complex and it is the main source of controversy among the philosophers of language and linguists. The major critique is the multifaced nature of what is said. On the one hand, what is said is considered as ambiguous and numerous read offs are required for its interpretation. Furthermore, currently, two different opposing positions exist on the nature of its interpretation. First, the minimalist camp, which is more Gricean in handling the notion and it does not allow for any aspects of pragmatic enrichment of the notion. This front of the camp is represented by Bach and Horn. The second camp, by contrast, argues for pragmatic augmentation and maximization of the notion of what is said. This front of the argument is represented by Levinson, Recanati and relevance theorists. This controversy and more detailed argumentation on the nature of what is said leads to numerous interpretations from different perspectives of what is said, which is far from a unified treatment of the notion.

2.7 Implicature / explicature

Relevance theorists have discarded 'what is said' and they do not use it; instead, they have coined and adopted a broader pragmatic notion than what is said, explicature. They also believe that on both sides of the distinction, pragmatic processes play an essential role. Horn and ward (2004) state that Relevance theory provides a richer notion of explicature because the original logical form is not propositional and it is an incomplete conceptual representation, therefore, this fragment of sentence operates as a guide for the pragmatic development of the propositional form. That is, the idea is that pragmatic inferential development is required to complete the speaker's encoded meaning to produce a fully propositional account. The logical form of the utterance is incomplete, explicature functions to linguistically flesh out the missing elements and subsequently produce a fully propositional content.

The pragmatic intrusion into Grice's what is said results in explicature. Chapman (2011) says that pragmatic enrichment is mandatory to generate a full propositional meaning because decoding alone can only form 'what is said' in Gricean term. Relevance theorists are not satisfied with this and push for further enrichment to generate a complete proposition. Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue that pragmatic principles must come into play much earlier than Grice assumed. Explicature is given a significant role in relevance theory because in the process of meaning recovery or recovering levels of meaning, explicature encompasses a larger area of meaning than the classical Gricean divide.

In Relevance theory, many Gricean and neo-Gricean sense of implicatures such as Scalar implicatures and generalized conversational implicatures are resolved and reduced into explicature. In the divide line of dichotomy, explicature falls on the side of what is said rather than on the side of what is conversationally implicated. Explicature takes over the position of Gricean what is said and it is contrasted with what is implicated. Although, explicature takes the opposite side of implicature, it is still significant to be able to tease apart the coded and inferred meanings of utterances in order to relate each level of meaning to its right position. All the differences aside, both explicature and implicature are two types of assumptions conveyed by the speaker and they are pragmatically inferred (Huang 2014).

(17) (a) *Peter's bat is grey.*
    (b) *The bat that is chosen by peter is grey.*

Chapman (2011) shows that relevance theorists argue that after reference assignment, deictic fixing and disambiguation of the senses of the above utterance the meaning of (a) is not complete enough to be truth evaluable. They put forward that the exact relationship between 'Peter' and 'bat' is unclear, that is, the bat owned by Peter, it could be chosen, killed, mentioned and so on by Peter. In order to resolve this, Sperber and Wilson (1995) suggest that contextual information should be added to settle the mis-construal of this phenomenon which is seen as semantic incompleteness rather than ambiguity of the genitive. The relationship between Peter and the bat in (b) is determined and which results in the production of explicature. However, explicature as an invented term by Relevance theorists was not spared from criticism. The critics of explicature argue that both explicature and implicature are derived through the same pragmatic processes of enrichment. So, here, the issue of how explicature and implicature are separated from each other arises and the distinction line of dichotomy between the two notions is unclear, since the same pragmatic processes is employed in their recovery. In addition to that, explicature interpretation is not a stable, in one go process, a single utterance can produce numerous explicatures, therefore, explicature derivation is a matter of degree.

2.8 Pragmatically enriched what is said / what is implicated

Recanati (1989) says *what is said* needs to be enriched pragmatically in various ways. There are certain unarticulated constituents that do not correspond to any linguistic element in the uttered sentence. These unarticulated constituents can be propositional or conceptual. The pragmatic process of enrichment that is suggested by Recanati works to bridge the gap between the unarticulated constituents and the linguistic expression. Establishing such correspondence requires three types of primary pragmatic processes. In the first place there is *saturation*; this primary pragmatic process contextually fills in a slot, position, or variable in the linguistically decoded logical form. Saturation is known to be a mandatory process performed on the linguistic logical form. It is also a bottom- up process, that is, a process which is triggered by a linguistic expression in the utterance itself. Saturation comes about due to expressions include unspecified comparison sets, possessive constructions, and expressions with free variable forms (Huang, 2014, p. 312). Consider the following examples:

    (18)(a) *Elizabeth is cleverer*
      (b) *I enjoyed reading John's book*
      (c) *John was late*

The above utterances are pragmatically saturated by adding the elements in the brackets in their counterpart utterances:

- (a) *Elizabeth is cleverer [than Naomi]*
- (b) *I enjoyed reading the book [written by] John.*
- (c) *John was late [for the seminar]*

the second type of primary pragmatic process is called *free enrichment*. This process is free because it is totally pragmatically rather linguistically driven. It is an optional 'top-down' process which is contextually motivated. Two subtypes of 'free enrichment' are identified: the first one is *strengthening or logical enrichment* and the second one is *expansion*. The first category's augmentation takes a complete proposition as an input which comes from saturation process subsequently generates a richer proposition as output which entails the original input proposition as in the following examples in the following.

(19) a. *I have brushed my teeth.*
    b. *I have brushed my teeth [this morning].*

For the second subtype of enrichment, *expansion*, a contextual conceptual element is required to be added. Contrary to the first subtype, the original input proposition is not retained.

(20) a. *The windows are bullet proof.*
    b. *The windows [of the president's limousine] are bullet proof.*

The third type of primary pragmatic process is called *semantic transfer*. It is a phenomenon whereby a referring expression uses metonymy to signify an object that is connected but not represented by the linguistic meaning of that utterance. Recanati (2003) briefly explains semantic transfer as a case in which a linguistic expression goes from one reference to another reference.

(21) *Plato is on the top shelf.*

In example (21) the proper name Plato, which designates a particular individual, is used to refer to one or more books written by him and this is achieved through reference shift.

Recanati's approach faces problem of how to distinguish what is pragmatically enriched said from what is said since both are recovered through the same process of meaning modulation. To treat the distinction process, Recanati proposed two tests, namely, the availability principle and the scope principle; nonetheless, neither of the tests deemed problem free. Moreover. He opts for partition of what is said into two parts: the semantic part which is the sentence meaning and the pragmatic part which is the pragmatically enriched said. It is suggested that it would have been better to split what is said into two independent levels of meaning and each level given its name based on their function in the distinction. Maintaining what is said and developing the pragmatic aspect of it with the help of elaboration and modulation of the linguistic meaning is costly for the hearers and proved to be complicated. Yet, what speaker is meant is encapsulated within the pragmatically enhanced what is said and not separated as an independent layer of meaning.

2.9 Implicature / entailment

Certain information is assumed by the speakers to be known by the listeners, that is, some kind of information is treated as known and generally will not be stated; consequently, it will be counted as part of what is communicated but not said. Entailment is something that is logically follows from what is asserted in the utterance. Sentences not speakers have entailments. In the pragmatics / semantics divide, entailment falls within the realm of the latter because in their interpretation the listener does not depend on the intention of the speaker. In other words, the listener does not recourse to inferential process to recover the unstated part of the utterance. In Entailment, the unsaid is bound within the sentence itself rather the speaker's meaning. Linguistic structures trigger entailment relations. Therefore, in entailment sentences that stand in an implication relation the truth of the first guarantees the truth of the second. Consider example (22).

(22)   a. *The anarchist assassinated the emperor.*
          b. *The emperor died. (entailment)*

the information that (22 b) contains is contained in the information that (22 a) conveys. That is, the situation described by (22 a) is also described by (22 b).

Contrary to entailment, implicature is 'an additional conveyed meaning' (Yule, 1996, p. 35). The speaker assumes that the hearer will be able to work out the implicature intended in the context on the basis of cooperative principle and its attendant maxims, shared knowledge and certain expectations. Implicature is a prominent instance of more is being communicated than is said and it is a pure pragmatic concept. Recovery of implicature requires the hearer's inferential ability because it is constituted of something that is more than

what the words mean and they are indirect, suggested and implicit. Implicature is one aspect of meaning that relies on context and the communicative intention of the speaker.

Moreover, understanding communication does not merely rely on the recognition of the meaning of the words in the utterance, but also depends on recognizing what speakers mean by their utterances in a particular context. Retrieval of implicature takes inference on the part of the listener which is 'additional information used by the listener to create a connection between what is said and what must be meant' (Yule, 2017, p. 370). It is significant to bear in mind that speakers communicate meanings through implicatures and listeners recover them via inference.

2.10 Implicature / presupposition

Both presupposition and implicature are pragmatic concepts and they are considered as meanings that are communicated implicitly rather than explicitly. However, they depart from each other based on certain distinct properties associated to each one. Presuppositions are intended meanings in the mind of the speaker, that is, speakers have presuppositions and entertain them as certain knowledge to be known or readily available to the hearers. They are manifested through the use of certain number of words, phrases, and structures. These linguistic forms considered as indicators of potential presupposition which can only become actual presupposition in contexts with speakers. They also possess the reputation of being resilient to changes in mood and negation (constancy under negation).

(23) a. *Mary's dog is cute.*
          b. *Mary's dog is not cute.*

Despite negation of (23 b) the presupposition of that Mary has a dog is still standing. Implicature is known to be cancelled, that is, it can disappear in certain linguistic or non-linguistic contexts. Inconsistency with semantic entailments, background assumptions and etc. leads to cancellation of implicatures.

(24)   *His wife is often complaining.*
          +> *His wife not always complaining.*
          ~+> *His wife, in fact always, complaining.*

Another distinction feature of conversational implicature is non-detachability. The same conversational implicature can be represented by any linguistic expression as long as the same semantic content is preserved. Conversational implicatures cannot be detached from the utterance because they are attached to the semantic content rather than to the form of what is said. Therefore, replacing the linguistic expressions with their synonyms does not affect the conversational, implicature and they remain intact (Huang, 2007).

2.11 Implicature / inference

According to Huang (2014) communication achievement is realized through expression and recognition of intentions. In the first place a communicator manifests his intentions through particular evidence to convey a certain meaning. The same communicated meaning is inferred by the hearers based on the evidence available to them. Davis (1998) says that there is a difference between what a speaker means and what the sentence used by the speaker means. Expression of a belief in a particular way is implicature, whereas, acquisition or possession of a belief in a particular way is inference. Speakers implicate and hearers infer. Implicature is counted as indirect speech act because to implicate something is to mean it by saying something else.

(25) Alan: Are you going to Paul's party?
       Barb: I have to work.

It can be understood from exchange (25) that Barb meant that she is not going to Paul's party by saying that she has to work. Interestingly, she neither mentioned that she is not going to Paul's party nor did the sentence she uttered meant that. So, by saying 'I have to work' Barb implicated that she is not going to the party and not going was her implicature. Implying and inferring can be problematic because these two levels of interpretation cause confusion and subsequently lead to misunderstanding of Grice's theory. Moreover, they are both misused and people often use inferring when they basically intend to use implying. Implicature 'is to hint at, suggest or convey something indirectly by means of language.' While, to infer 'is to deduce something from evidence may be linguistic, paralinguistic or/ and non-linguistic (Thomas, 1995, p.58)

2. Meaning Trichotomies

In the previous section, the basic meaning distinctions (dichotomies) were explicated. These meaning dichotomies have failed to address that puzzling question of whether or not implication should be recognized as a three-way process rather than a two-way process. In what follows, the attempt is to elucidate this process by looking at implication as a trichotomy.

2.1 What is said/ impliciture / implicature

Bach (1994) claims that not all implicit components of communicated meaning are implicatures. There are some aspects of speaker meaning that do not fall on either side of the meaning dichotomy. That is, they are neither part of what is said nor of what is implicated. Therefore, based on this premise, in Bachian pragmatics there is no pragmatic intrusion into what is said. Impliciture is the expanded and completed versions of semantic content according which it is partly implicit in

what is explicit. Impliciture goes beyond what is said but yet falls short to be included within the realm of additionally conveyed meaning, implicature. Unlike implicature, impliciture is conveyed directly while implicature is not. Impliciture is closely connected to the semantic content of the uttered sentence. Moreover, it involves in saying something but partially because part of what is meant is left implicit.

On the other hand, implicature is not associated with the semantic content, although it is computed partly on the basis of the uttered sentence. It is something not said, not even partially. In implicating something, a speaker says one thing and communicates something else in addition or something totally different. Huang (2017, p.174) says that there is no intrusion into what is said since certain communicative content does not have to sit on either side of the meaning dichotomy rather it forms an intermediate ground between what is said and what is conversationally implicated.

This level of meaning is formed based on the fact that some fragment sentences express incomplete or sub-propositions which need to be filled in contextually to become fully propositional. It can be understood that impliciture forms an intermediate level of speaker-meaning and adds another level that results in a trichotomy instead of dichotomy. What is said is incomplete proposition that is sub-propositional. It cannot be evaluated truth conditionally therefore it needs to be completed or filled in contextually to become fully propositional. Bach (ibid) suggests two types of impliciture which are generated via application of pragmatic processes of completion and expansion:

1- Pragmatic process of *completion*: It is a process that will provide an extra propositional or conceptual content to the propositional radicals and consequently produces full propositions. In this case the hearer fills in the propositional radicals because the sentence is semantically underdeterminate.

(26) a. *John is too tired [to carry the suitcase]*
       b. *John needs a boat [to cross the river]*

2- Pragmatic process of *expansion*: this process adds no extra proposition because each sentence expresses a full but minimal proposition. However, such proposition falls short of what the speaker intends to communicate; therefore, expansion is required to flesh out the proposition expressed in order to generate a richer proposition. The pragmatically augmented proposition becomes identical to what the speaker has intentionally meant.

(27) a. *I have eaten lunch [Today]*
       b. *I have been to New Zealand [before]*

In both examples (26) and (27), each of the bracketed elements of meaning contribute to what is communicated. The result of completion and expansion

Bach (1994) calls it Impliciture because it is implicit in what is explicit. Impliciture represents a third category of communicated content, a category that is intermediate between Grice's what is said and what is conversationally implicated. Impliciture goes beyond what is said but unlike implicatures, which are additional propositions external to what is said. Implicitures are built out of what is said; however, it can neither be constitutive of what is said nor derived as a conversational implicature because they can be cancelled on the one hand and are truth conditionally relevant on the other (Horn, 2004). As in the below given examples:

(28) a. I have had a shower. (What is said)

b. I have had a shower [this morning] (Impliciture)

c. I have had a shower, but not this morning. (Cancelled Impliciture)

Impliciture will then provide input to the classical Gricean pragmatic mechanism (cooperative principle and maxims) generating conversational implicatures as output. Based on the previous deliberation, it is very likely that one can make a deduction about the viability of Bach's theory of trichotomy. So, the traditional Gricean dichotomy between what is said and what is conversationally implicated is replaced by a trichotomy: what is said, what is implicit, and what is implicated. What is said is the conventional meaning of the sentence after refence assignment, deixis fixing and ambiguity resolution. While impliciture is the middle ground between the two poles of classical dichotomy of utterance meaning, which is formed based on the recovery of what is implicit in what is explicit. In other words, impliciture comes into existence via the application of two pragmatic processes each used based on the nature of the utterance. The completion process is applied to fill in the sentences which are incomplete and their propositional content requisites enrichment. These types of utterances are semantically underdetermined. The second process, expansion, occurs when the utterance does express a full proposition but yet the speaker meaning is not fully expressed, therefore, the expnasion process which is mandated pragmatically will flesh out the proposition expressed to match it up with what the speaker intended to communicate. These to categories, what is said and what is conversationally implicit, are tied to the conventional meaning of the utterance but each go through certain process to reach their potential realization. However, Implicature is external to the meaning of the utterance and it is an additional and invisible meaning of the utterance which is computed based on the input from the previous two categories and the inferential power of the hearer.

3.2 What is said/ generalized conversational Impliciture / what is implicated

Traditionally, in the theory of meaning and communication there are two levels of meaning: a level of sentence-type- meaning versus a level of utterance-token- meaning. The investigation of the former is associated with semantics whereas the latter belongs to pragmatics. However, Levinson (2000, p.22) argues against such a view and says it "s surely in adequate, indeed potentially pernicious, because it underestimates the regularity, recurrence, and systematicity of many kinds of pragmatic inference."

Levinson proposed to add a third layer – utterance-type- meaning to the two generally accepted levels of meaning. Conveyance of an utterance loaded with information fully and literally consumes time and energy to express it. Therefore, Levinson treats this issue with a general principle: 'let not only the content but also the metalinguistic properties of the utterance (i.e., its form) carry the message.' For this reason, he has developed the theory of GCI into an account of 'presumptive meanings. Computation of this layer does not depend directly on speaker intentions but rather on expectations of how language is used. This third layer is the level of generalized, preferred or default interpretation. He argues for the inclusion of generalized conversational implicatures on this layer of meaning. As mentioned earlier, the classical Gricean theory distinguishes between what is said and what is conversationally implicated, that is a level of encoded meaning and a level of inferential meaning. Basically, the division is a dichotomy between two poles, whilst, the Neo-Gricean paradigm, especially, Levinsonian pragmatics is not satisfied with this dichotomy and adds another layer to the theory of meaning. Consequently, the traditional account of meaning dichotomy is substituted with trichotomy.

In the Gricean account what is said is taken to be (i) the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered with the exclusion of any conventional implicature, and (ii) the truth conditional content of the sentence uttered. Grice (1989, p. 25) and Levinson (2000, p. 172-86) suggest that before we work out what is said, we have to (i) resolve reference, (ii) fix deixis, (iii) disambiguate expressions, (iv) unpack ellipsis, (v) narrow generalities. What is conversationally implicated is defined in contrast to and calculated on the basis of what is said, that is, what is said provides input to what is implicated. Moreover, determination of (i) to (v) involves pragmatically enriched meaning. In other words, there is pragmatic intrusion into what is said, into the conventional, truth conditional content, in order to determine what Grice called what is said.

Two positions are dealing with this phenomenon, pragmatic intrusion. The first position claims that pragmatic intrusion is different and separate from conversational implicature. The proponents of this camp

include three lines of argument: Sperber and Wilson (1993) claim that pragmatic inference is an explicature, that is, a development of the logical form of the sentence uttered. The second line of the argument is Recanati (1993) who believes that the intrusion results in the pragmatically enriched what is said.

The last line is Bach (1994) suggests a third category of communicative content, Impliciture. The second position is taken by Levinson (2000). He believes that pragmatic intrusion into what is said is not any of the above mentioned by the proponents of the first position. Rather, it is the same as a Neo-Gricean conversational implicature. He also admits, contrary to Grice, that conversational implicatures can intrude upon truth conditional content. Admission of intrusion can lead to 'Grice's circle', a problem which arises due to reciprocal influence between what is said and what is conversationally implicated.

The idea is, what is conversationally implicated can be contrasted to and calculated on the basis of what is said, given that what is said seems to both determine and be determined by what is conversationally implicated. Basically, this reciprocal influence contradicts the fundamental view of semantics and pragmatics interface. However, Levinson (2000) provides a solution by rejecting this view and suggest that Neo-Gricean pragmatics should be allowed to play a systematic role in 'pre' semantics, that is to help determine the truth conditional content of the sentence uttered (Heine and Narrog, 2010)

Grice (1989) defines GCIs as inferences which are non-explicit meanings that occur by default in general no- specific context. GCIs are calculated immediately and no effort is required because they are inferences that occur from below. Linguistic elements are triggers of the implicature; therefore, the contextual information is irrelevant in their recovery. In another way, these kinds of pragmatic inferences have predictable, immutable and even conventional interpretation. Subsequently, it is suggested that GCIs should be included on this third layer. In order to account for this type of conversational implicature, Levinson (2000) postulated a set of three heuristics- the Q (quantity)-, I (informativeness) -, and M (Manner):

The Q heuristic,' what isn't said, is not'. This principle establishes that what is not mentioned or not included in the utterance is not the case. It is also responsible for the inference of so- called scalar implicatures because the elements are arranged on a scale from the weakest element (e.g., some) to the strongest (e.g., all). In case the speaker decides to use the weakest element on the scale, it implicates that the strongest is not held.

(29) John: what time is it?
Mary: Some of the guests have already left.

The use of 'some' in Mary's reply indicates by default or without considering any specific context, not all of the guests have left but only some did. It is not part of the meaning of 'some' but it is one would infer in the absence to the contrary.

The I- heuristic 'what is simply described is stereotypically exemplified'. The basic tenet of this principle is based on the fact that it is not necessary to say what can be assumed by the hearer. This principle is aligned with Grice's premise 'do not make your contribution more informative than is required.'

(30) Dean and Cathy bought a flat.

Taking I- heuristic into consideration, it would be inferred that 'Dean and Cathy bought one flat together.' The idea of togetherness is not present or not mentioned explicitly in the utterance but bearing in mind the I- principle the hearer can effortlessly can infer that the purchase of the residence took place by the couple jointly not individually each. The M- heuristic, 'what is said in an abnormal way, is not normal' or 'marked message indicates a marked situation.' Again, this third principle also emphasizes Grice's fourth maxim of manner 'avoid obscurity of expression' and 'be brief'. If a speaker describes a situation in an abnormal or marked way, it is inferable that the situation in question is not normal, typical of prototypical.

(31) a. Adam stopped the car.
*   b. Adam made the car stop*

Example (31a) shows that the act was performed in a normal, typical way, usually, by applying the brake. However, the utterance (31b) guides the hearer to infer that the act of 'stopping the car' was not usual. Certain expressions are employed to suggest abnormality of a situation and will lead the hearer to read into the utterance and deduce extra meaning (Pastor-Cerezula et al., 2018).

4. Conclusions

In this article the authors argue for meaning trichotomies rather than dichotomies for these meaning dichotomies have failed to address that puzzling question of whether or not implication should be recognized as a three-way process rather than a two-way process. The following are the core points that have been drawn from the review of the meaning trichotomy issue:

• Basically, the meaning division is a dichotomy between two poles, whilst, the Neo-Gricean paradigm, especially, Levinsonian pragmatics is not satisfied with this dichotomy and adds another layer to the theory of meaning.

• Grice's presentation of theory of Implicature is deemed as a sketchy proposal. Grice made the distinction between what is said and what is implicated. However, *what is said* is quite complex and is the main

source of controversy among the philosophers of language and linguists.

• Moreover, in Grice's classical theory, *what is said* can be envisaged in two more distinctions: 'what is said versus what is implicated', and 'what is said versus what is meant.' Moreover, right after the establishment of the implicature notion, some linguists and language philosophers argued for additional terms to account for other aspects of pragmatic inferences that implicature theory has failed to account for.

• Consequently, the traditional account of meaning dichotomy is better substituted with trichotomy as certain communicative content does not have to sit on either side of the meaning dichotomy rather it forms an intermediate ground between what is said and what is conversationally implicated.

• Based on the previous deliberation, it is very likely that one can make a deduction about the viability of Bach's theory of trichotomy. So, the traditional Gricean dichotomy between what is said and what is conversationally implicated is replaced by a trichotomy: what is said, what is implicit, and what is implicated.

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