Genealogy of Sovereignty in Southern Kurdistan from 1917 to 1947

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ABSTRACT

The notion of sovereignty has both historical and philosophical significance for the purpose of nation-building and state-craft. Without grasping the centrality of this concept, we could argue that any attempt at nation-building is doomed to failure. Throughout modern Kurdish history, we could notice that several discourses of sovereignty have been at the heart of each national movement. This article deals heavily with the early sightings of these discourses among the Kurdish national movement, specifically during the establishment and eventual fall of the Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad which hugely affected the discourses of sovereignty in Southern Kurdistan. However, the article is not only limited to this timeframe but expands its scope beyond this period and deals with the impact of this historical event on the general discourse of sovereignty, and in particular its consequential influence over the Kurdistan liberation movement in Southern Kurdistan. As the article's main focus, such influence is shown in the way which Mulla Mustafa Barzani carries the discourse of sovereignty, born out of the experience of the Kurdistan Republic, to the Kurdistan liberation movement in Southern Kurdistan. In particular, the article deals with the immediate aftermath of the downfall of the Republic and its significance afterward. For this purpose, a genealogical theory and method pioneered by the French philosopher Michel Foucault has been utilized, since to understand the discourse of sovereignty means to understand Foucault's theoretical and methodological approach.

KEY WORDS: Genealogy, Foucault, Theory as Method, Sovereignty, Southern Kurdistan, Kurdistan Republic, Mulla Mustafa Barzani.

1. INTRODUCTION

The notion of a sovereign state is fairly a modern and novel conception. Anna Stilz (2019, pp. 1-5) argues that even though the current vision of societies obliges us to think of sovereign states, the notion of sovereign states is comparatively new. In her argument, she refers to many different organizing factors, such as state sovereignty, that throughout history have played out the role of organizing and conglomerating dispersed numbers of people into a fairly fixed unit, the sort of which we could now term "state".

Stilz argues that the early nomadic societies formed "bands"; these small groups joined together in order to create some sort of protective zone for the members of the group. Stilz defines "band societies" as those forms of societies that "are usually highly egalitarian, lacking formal political leadership, and featuring an economy based on sharing" (Stilz, 2019, p. 2). Following this early type come the precontract societies that were ruled and organized through a sachem. Stilz defines sachem as the early conception of a ruler with semi-authority to hold a group of people together; however, this early ruler "had no binding legislative authority: he could not impose legal obligations on the members of his band" (Stilz, 2019, p. 3). From these early starting points of societal organizations, the historical evolution of societies progressed into tribes, which created needs for fixed territories and claims of ownership of land; then came the rise of empires, and their eventual fall and ultimately the emergence of sovereign state system after the

Westphalian treaty of 1648. The difference between the empires, such as Roman or Ottoman that lasted over 600 years, and the sovereign state model is the fact that empires rarely allocated authority according to recognized territorial boundaries, as Kratochwil (1986, pp. 35-36) argues. In contrast to Empire model, the sovereign state model is built on the recognition of formal boundaries. In between the fall of empires and rise of sovereign state model, an intermezzo of various different types of alternative sources of authority appeared. As Stilz points out, the emergence of "personal political authority" in Medieval Europe in forms of "towns, lords, kings, emperors, popes, and bishops" claimed the right to rule over people (Stilz, 2019, p. 4). Thereafter, the feudal system emerged that created the duality of feudal lord and the peasant bondsman [1].

Following the fall of empires and emergence of sovereign state system around the globe, a historical point that followed the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 as argued by Krasner (2001, pp. 17-19), the territory of old empires disintegrated and broke up into smaller entities of sovereign states. These smaller entities, the sovereign states, were marked out on the basis of the "principles of autonomy, territory, mutual recognition and control" (Krasner, 2001, p. 17). Each of these principles work simultaneously to conjure up the image of what we could then term, in modern socio-political jargon, as a sovereign state. Let's have a quick review of each of these principles; first, in order to understand the principle of territoriality, as Behr (2007, p. 113) argues, we need to grasp its "mutual interdependency" with four concepts, namely sovereignty, (national) integration, the function of borders and national security" (Behr, 2007, p. 113). As Behr also points out, these concepts not only provide a ground for traditional standpoint vis-à-vis state, such concept helps to demystify the importance of conceptualization of such principles and their dependence on what Behr terms "territorial fixation" (Behr, 2007, p. 113). This article seeks to understand the genealogical basis for the concept of sovereignty during the early years of modern Kurdish history, beginning from the establishment of Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad to its eventual demise and the immediate aftermath of it. As identified, such historical review shall begin from the times of formation of the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad and onwards. The reason for pointing out this republic which was formed in the

Eastern Kurdistan is the presence of the Barzanis and the changes happened in their discourse since then.

2. THEORY AS METHOD: GENEALOGY AS THEORY AND METHOD

It has been argued by Smith (1983, pp. 6-9) and Heshusius and Smith (1986, pp. 5-8) that method, within the scope of social science research and ultimately its discourse, has been mainly governed by either the realist, or quantitatively positivistic approach, and the idealist model of epistemology, or the qualitatively critical approach. Such rivalry, as both Smith (1983, p. 6) and Heshusius (1986, pp. 5-6) argue, has wrought at times nothing other than obfuscation. The positivistic approach presupposes some form of social reality that could be thought of as independent of "the knower that can be known if only the knower can be divested of values, that is, if the knower can be objective" (Cooke, 1994, p. 47). Thus, this positivistic methodology utilizes randomization, blind tests, the null hypothesis, the separation of the researcher from the subject, and numerous other devices practically to force a separation of fact and value in the practice of knowing. Claims about social reality which do not utilize such practices are criticized as being conditioned or biased by the values, emotions, or interests of the knower.

Theory as method is a widely used approach in social science research, whereby theoretical frameworks and concepts are used as a methodological tool for conducting research and analysis. This approach involves using theory to guide research questions, data collection, and analysis, with the aim of generating new insights and understandings of the social world. This article provides an overview of the concept of theory as method, and explores its uses and limitations in social science research.

3. TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

By the early 20th century, there was a major paradigm shift within the scope of philosophical and social enquiry called the "linguistic turn". As explained by both Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963) and Richard Rorty (1992 [1967]), the linguistic turn provided suitable grounds for major shifts in the relationship that language had with the various disciplines of humanities and social sciences; such shift meant that language, as explained by Henry, was released from "imprisonment in its communicative role,

as modern cultural systems continue the process of internal differentiation" (1995, p. 635).

The main focus of the philosophical investigation, heavily influenced and reshaped by the emphasis on the role of language, at the turn of the Twentieth century was geared towards the question of whether the traditional philosophical enquiry can continue as it had been throughout history. Rorty, as the main focal point in this philosophical enquiry, argued for a "revolution" within the philosophical investigation vis-à-vis language (Timcke, 2019, p. 2). Such revolution brought with it the line of argument that languages are "figurative modes which do not merely signify but also constitute the objects to which they refer" (Timcke, 2019, p. 9).

What could be firmly argued and supported, an understanding shared by Marianne Jørgensen (2002) and Sara Mills (2005), is that such methodology, deep-rooted within the works of Foucault, belongs to the social constructionism[2] camp in its purest form. The tools of analysis for Foucault, are those of discourse analysis. Discourse refers to the understanding that language is structured according to the patterns of utterances by the people, and as such this structure is a direct result of people's participation within a given social domain – i.e., political discourse, religious discourse, …etc (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Discourse Analysis is that methodological practice that tends to analyze and examine these myriad patterns of language within the social domain. Foucault, having been influenced greatly by the structuralist [3] and post-structuralist thinkers such as Ferdinand de Saussure, Louis Althusser and Roland Barthes, could be known as the founder of discourse analysis. Megill, for instance, argues that the archaeological phase within the spectrum of Foucault's philosophical underpinning was "in essence, a hybrid and unstable combination of conventionally historiographical concerns with certain structuralist themes and preoccupations" (1979, p. 459). On the other hand, the post-structuralist influence is also palpable. Since Foucault argues for contingency, openness and what James Williams terms as "historical conditioning", he could neither be thought of as a Marxist in its purest sense nor a Liberal thinker; "like many poststructuralists, his work falls between determinism and freedom", and this places him right in the fore-front of post-structuralist movement (Williams, 2005, p. 106).

Following Foucault, many other types of discourse analysis emerged; we could refer to Ernesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe's Discourse Theory, the Critical Discourse Analysis pioneered by Norman Fairclough; and the Discursive Psychology traced back to the works of Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell. What all these varieties of Discourse Analysis have in common is their emphasis on the fact that language, and in fact the simple act of talking, does not reflect our worldview or identity per se, it is the very force behind the changes and reshaping our position within a given social setting. Jørgensen goes as far as claiming that Discourse Analysis can be put to use as a "framework for analyzing the national identity of various countries" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). All this would eventually push us towards the core tenets of Social Constructionism argument; that which we take as reality is socially constructed. And to add to this, we could argue that the force which governs our understanding of reality is through discourse.

It needs to be said that Foucault remains the most influential thinker of the development of discourse analysis. All other categories of discourse analysis arise either as homage to or critical of Michel Foucault's input in this approach. As Jørgensen explains, we could basically divide the works and trajectory of Foucault's line of thought into two phases: the archaeological phase and the genealogical phase.

In the archaeological phase, it can be argued that Foucault is more concerned about "the rules that determine which statements are accepted as meaningful and true in a given epoch" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 12). Such separation is not intended to signify the fact that the two phases are extremely dissimilar and afar, there are overlaps and continuous intermingling between the two phases. The importance of his theory of discourse lies at the heart of the archaeological phase. His definition of discourse is clearly mentioned in the *Archeology of Knowledge* as follows:

> We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation; […discourse] is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form that also possesses a history; […] it is, from beginning to end,

historical — a fragment of history, a unity and discontinuity in history itself, posing the problem of its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality rather than its sudden irruption in the midst of the complicities of time. (Foucault, 2002 [1969], p. 117)

As it can be understood and deduced from the above statement, Foucault firmly places himself within the social constructionism approach (Mills, 2005). According to Foucault, truth is not outside of the social domain, a premise that would find its adherents within the positivism approach, rather truth is "discursive construction". As such, different regimes of knowledge bring about different understandings of what is, and ultimately could be, taken as truth. Within this phase, Foucault is more interested and concerned about the study and investigation of different regimes of knowledge", the rules that are capable to identify what can and cannot be uttered (Mills, 1997, p. 18). Jørgensen argues that despite the fact that there are various ways of [self-]expression, what can actually be said is already part of a "common discourse", it is more repetitive than unique (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 13).

On the other hand, if we turn our attention to the Genealogical phase, we can discern that Foucault develops a theory about the relationship between power and knowledge. Here, instead of focusing on the dichotomy of agent/structure, Foucault replaces that dichotomy with another and concentrates on the interwoven nature of power/knowledge; power, in this sense, becomes the main ingredient that ultimately produces and identifies what is both true and false. As Jørgensen (2002, p. 13) argues, power is not a mere tool and facility of an agent, be it an individual or a group, rather it is engrained across several social practices. Additionally, power could also be understood as not entirely oppressive, rather it is productive. It is productive in the sense that it constitutes discourse, knowledge, bodies and ultimately leads to the formation of the subject. Foucault explains his stance on this matter in the following excerpts:

> "What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure,

forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression." (Foucault, 1980, p. 119)

This could help the argument that power, in the Foucauldian sense, provides the conditions of what he calls as "*the social*". As argued by Mills, power creates the social world and distinguishes the objects and orders them accordingly. For instance, in the *Discipline and Punish*, we could clearly witness Foucault's attempts at placing power at the center of his argumentation with regard to the changes and transformation of our understanding of what crime and criminality has been throughout the recent history.

4. EARLY SIGHTINGS OF THE DISCOURSE OF SOVEREIGNTY

In order to provide a genealogical account of sovereignty in Southern Kurdistan, we are obliged to first glance over the history of the region and map out the series of events that happened. To this end, it would be reasonable to periodize the modern history of Southern Kurdistan into two main categories: 1945 to 1991, and 1992 to 2021. With this in sight, we could manage to pinpoint a historical starting point for the purposes of the scope of the current research. Perhaps, the question might arise as to the reason behind choosing the 1945 as the historical starting point for our analysis. It is by no means *the* birth of Kurdistan's, or rather Kurdish, strife for gaining independence. The Great War had already affected the region in spectacular fashion. As argued by Wadie Jwaidieh, during the First World War, the Kurds experienced a devastating famine that threatened to wipe out the entirety of the Kurdish population (2006, pp. 125-127). The traces of discourse of sovereignty, in its variety of forms, are long and extend to a period before the scope of this research. For example, the very first attempts at gathering intellectual discourse about the socio-political status of Kurds goes back to the publication of the Kurdistan newspaper in 1898 in Cairo by Mikdat Midhat Badrkhan. The newspaper was published by "one of the sons of Badrkhan, the emir of the former Kurdish principality of Botan [in 1898 in Cairo]. It did not represent a particular political organization or tendency, and therefore it offered intellectuals of various ideological hues a forum for the exchange of ideas" (Hitchins, 2018,

p. 86). Nevertheless, it could be argued that the first appearance of the discourse of independence, or more accurately pseudo-independence, appeared around the late stage of the First World War in Kurdistan. As Eppel points out, the beginnings of modern politics among Kurds could be traced back to the political turmoil within the Ottomans empire; in 1908, "Kurdish students in Istanbul established the Kurdish Hope Society (*Hevi Kurdi Jemʿiyati*), also known as the Hope Society of Kurdish Students (*Kurd Talaba Hevi Jemʿiyati*)" (Eppel, 2016, p. 92). This organization was active in Istanbul until the outbreak of World War I and even "attempted to establish branches in European cities. It published a newspaper, Kurd's Day (*Roja Kurd*) in the *Kurmanji* dialect; the name was changed to Kurd's Sun (*Hetave Kurd*) in 1912." (Eppel, 2016, p. 92)

The socio-political landscape from the last years of the World War I and the consequent years, especially the immediate years of 1918-1923, have had drastic effects on the discourse of sovereignty. It was right after 1918 that a confluence of events and clashing discourses, both within Kurdish society and out, emerged and appeared to shape and reshape the discursive nature sovereignty constantly. As Jwaideh points out, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the WWI, the Kurdish discourse of autonomy was in full view. "In June 1918, at a time when the outcome of the war was still uncertain, Sharif Pasha contacted Sir Percy Cox, the chief officer of British forces in Mesopotamia, and proposed the adoption by the British of a bold and imaginative policy with regard to the Kurds" (Jwaideh, 2006, p. 129). As it can be interpreted, the nationalistic discourse was on the rise among the Kurds in this period. This came at a time when Kurdistan had not been fragmented into its "four zones"; yet, the nationalistic discourse was especially gaining steam. The Kurdish nationalistic discourse, as Jwaideh highlights, was accompanied by another ethno-nationalistic discourse that tried to carve up its own nationalistic destiny following the Ottoman empire's defeat, namely the Armenians (2006, p. 130). This led to the Peace Conference in Istanbul in 1918, and the Turks of the Ottoman empire, who were now desperate to salvage the situation in their favor, approached the Kurds. A council of three representatives [4] is said to have been formed, and following discussions with the Turks, the following deliberations and points were agreed:

- The recognition of a large measure of autonomy in Kurdistan.
- The immediate promulgation of laws resulting from the foregoing decision.

- The unimpeded execution of all obligations following from these laws.
- The Kurds to undertake to continue being a part of the Ottoman Empire and to continue to recognize the suzerainty of the sultan-caliph (Jwaideh, 2006, p. 130).

It could be argued that the socio-political discourse among the Kurds at this stage was more inclined towards achieving a meagre degree of autonomy and had not reached the parameters of full-blown sovereignty discourse. Perhaps, we could argue that the shared religion between both Kurds and Turks might have influenced Kurdish discourse to some extent. As Bruinessen argues,

> "It is not a coincidence that many of the early Kurdish uprisings with a nationalist dimension were led by sufi shaykhs: the large rebellions of Shaykh 'Ubaydullah (1880) and the shaykhs of Barzan in central Kurdistan, Shaykh Sa'id (1925) in the North, and Shaykh Mahmud Barzinji (1919, 1922 and 1931) in southern Kurdistan, and several minor uprisings. For a long time, secular nationalists had to enter into alliances with such shaykhs because only the latter could mobilize the masses" (2011, p. 51).

As it could be argued, the common religion between Kurds and Turks was a reason for not demanding full sovereignty/independence. The Kamalist movement in Turkey provided a socio-political discourse where the emphasis was that the Kurds-Turks "brotherhood and long history" convinced the Kurdish leaders and main stream people to stand with Turks against "infidels". Here we begin to see the emergence of rivaling discourses within the socio-political status of the Kurds. The predominance or subservience of a discourse could be a direct result of the power relations existing within the Kurdish society back in 1918, and indeed even before this period, up to contemporary times. As nationalistic an intention as it was, the 1918 situation and the following years, with the emergence of Treaty of Sevres [5] and its demise, is testament to the fact that the inner rivaling discourses and their eventual clashes forged the outcomes for the Kurdish society. Such inner rivalry of clashing discourses continued until the years leading to the World War II and its eventual end in 1945. A question might arise as to reasons behind choosing 1945 as the historical starting point of this research. The reason for this is quite straightforward: 1945 was the year before the emergence of first Kurdish republic, the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad. It was during this short-lived and aborted republic that the discourse of sovereignty

reached its ultimate peak for the first time. Indeed, the clashing discourses and the wider global forces played their parts in its emergence and subsequent demise. However, the impact has been ever-lasting and has had its reverberation in the Southern Kurdistan to this day. Therefore, in the following segments of our analysis, it is intended to investigate the historical trajectory of the Southern Kurdistan through reading and analyzing the impact of three main rivaling discourses: the discourse of sovereignty, in its various and multifaceted forms; the religious discourse; and the subaltern discourse of dependency.

The years prior to 1945, and the establishment of Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad, witnessed the fragmentation of Kurdish nation and its territory divided between four other countries. Following the abortive Treaty of Sevres and the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne, the republics of Turkey and Iraq were carved at the expense of Kurdish nationalistic aspirations [6]. It was thus exactly during these tumultuous circumstances that the tripartite discursive rivalry sprang up. Moreover, it should also be added that the sociopolitical circumstances in Southern Kurdistan[7] from 1945 to 1961 were multifaceted and deeply predisposed to influences by wider regional and international dynamics. Our in-depth analysis obliges us to have a broad notion of both global and local circumstances as well as the internal discursive clashes and power relations.

Perhaps the very first historical phase that we should return to is the post-World War II era (1945-1958). This period came right after the decision of the Great Britain in February 1929 to renounce its mandate on the territories that were soon to become Iraq. This allowed the conditions for the creation, and indeed independence, of Iraq "where no mention was made regarding Kurdish autonomy" and therefore provoked the "largest urban mobilizations in Iraqi Kurdistan during the Mandate," (Gorgas, 2008, p. 537). The Kurdish societal make-up of this period, having been overwhelmed by the rule of *aghas* and tribal leaders, did not express vastly radical nationalistic demands. McDowall suggests that mostly the tribal chieftains and *aghas* were prepared to discard grievances amid their own communities; this was due to the growing confidence that they had in their positions due to "King Faysal's moderating influence, and this was an effective palliative to Arab rule," (McDowall, 2004, p. 287). However, this is not to say that the discourse of sovereignty and nationalistic sentiments were totally absent, rather that the center of this socio-political center from post-WWI to 1943 was largely in the northern part of Kurdistan, or what is now known to be the "Turkish" Kurdistan. From the Sheikh Ubaydullah's rise to prominence, which was simultaneous with "first stage of a greater consciousness of Kurdish nationalism", to the developments of Kurdish discourse of nationalism

following the Sevres Treaty and the outbreak of Sheikh Said's rebellion in 1925, the intensity of discourse of sovereignty was geographically away from the Southern Kurdistan. The sparks of the discourse surrounding themes such as nation, cultural heritage, Kurdish language, and ultimately the greater demands for political inclusion could be traced back to 1930 and specifically to the bloodshed in Sulaimani. However, as McDowall (2004, pp. 288-290) and later on van Bruinessen (1992, pp. 69-73) point out, the social setting of Kurdish territories was not totally in sync with the rising discourse of sovereignty, meaning the overly feudalistic traditions and customs clashed repeatedly with the intellectually-backed sentiments and political discourse propelled in the urban areas.

In 1937 and onwards, we can witness the slow re-emergence and revival of Kurdish socio-political awareness under the discourse of nationalism[8]. Clandestine activities and groups emerged; "a new class of young professional Kurds which hoped for a degree of independence was coming into existence. Other groups began to form clandestinely. One of these, Komalai Brayati (Brotherhood Society), was led by Shaykh Mahmud's son, Shaykh Latif… Younger and more radical nationalists in Sulaimani formed another group, Darkar (Woodcutters)," (McDowall, 2004, pp. 289-290). These groups saw relevant success from time to time, though the peak of socio-political movements was through the revolt commonly known as "Mulla Mustafa Barzani's Revolt of 1943-45".

It could be argued that the discourse of sovereignty, in its various forms, was unable to impose itself by the intellectual leadership of that time. This could partly be due to the fact that the actual power relations within the Kurdistan's social framework leveled against intelligentsia and was more inclined to the sheikhdom and traditionalist social structures of the society. McDowall explains that "The failure of the new intellectual leadership to attract the old agha class was clearly illustrated in the revolt of Mulla Mustafa Barzani in 1943" (2004, p. 290). Having labelled as "a rebel and disturber of the peace" by the then government of Iraq, Shaykh Ahmad's revolt back in 1930s remained on the margins of the discourse of sovereignty (Jwaideh, 2006, p. 219). As far as it is known, at the beginning and at the heart of this revolt, there was a territorial dispute between Shaykh Ahmad and the Assyrian settlements that started to appear within his socio-political domain. This frustrated the order of things, and indeed the power relations within the territory, causing and motivating Shaykh Ahmad to decide to move against such intrusions. Whereas the revolt was initially a grievance to the emergence of Assyrian settlements, as Jwaideh argues, it soon developed into a nationalistic movement. The discourse of sovereignty, a territorial one in nature,

therefore, clashed with and was confronted by the Iraqi government. Hence, the first sparks of sovereignty-seeking discourse emerged and continued until 1935 (2006, pp. 224-228). The revolt in itself was the catalyst that discourse of nationalism, and by extension sovereignty, needed. Jwaideh explains that,

> "By the time that the Barzani rebellion of 1931-32 was over, much blood and treasure had been wasted, and the Barzan region, the scene of military operations, was devastated and its inhabitants impoverished. By adding new grievances and grudges to the old, the rebellion placed heavy strains on Kurdish-Arab relations." (Jwaideh, 2006, p. 228)

Succeeding his brother Shaykh Ahmad, Mulla Mustafa Barzani's revolt of 1943-45 could be considered as the truest form of sovereignty-seeking discourse back then. Clashes and bitter relations with some of the rivaling chieftains in the area by this time had caused more disdain and grievances towards the political control of Iraqi government. Having escaped from the imposed exile from Sulaimani, Mulla Mustafa Barzani's return to the Barzan area caused a re-organization of the masses around him. Gaining popular support and growing in confidence, Mulla Mustafa adapted a "new and perhaps an unexpected role" that had been "thrusted upon him by the forces he had set in motion," (Jwaideh, 2006, p. 231). Propelled to the role of the leader of nationalist movement, and having confronted the political reins of Iraqi government, Barzani[9] put forward the following demands which could be read as compliant with the discourse of Sovereignty-seeking:

- Creation of an all-Kurdish province embracing the *liwas* of Kirkuk, Erbil, and Sulaimani, as well as the Kurdish districts of Mosul – Dohuk, Amedia, Akre, Zakho, Sinjar, and Shaykhan – and Khanaqin in Diyala district.
- The appointment of a Kurdish official with cabinet rank to administer the newly created Kurdish Province.
- The appointment of a Kurdish undersecretary to each of the various ministries.
- The cultural, economic, and agricultural autonomy of Kurdistan in the widest possible sense, except in matters pertaining to the army and the gendarmerie.
- The dismissal or transfer from the Kurdish areas of officials known for bribery or misuse of authority.

- The adoption of Kurdish as an official language. (Jwaideh, 2006, p. 232)

It should also be said that the stark absence of explicit civil engagement from 1920s through late 1930s showcases the fragility of discourse of sovereignty within the Kurdish national movement. However, this discourse had been fostering and progressing clandestinely amid the growing Kurdish intelligentsia and away from the attention of the Iraqi authorities. Ibrahim Ahmad, one of the leading intellectuals of the time who had immense political influence among the Kurdish intellectual class, became active and anonymously published an article in a journal called "*Yadigari Lawan*" (Youth Memory) in 1933; then, he started publishing and translating articles in "al-Bilad" journal in 1935-37. Upon publishing an article titled "Kurds and Arabs" in 1937, he faced political charges and was subpoenaed to appear at the court. 1939 was the year when Ibrahim Ahmad obtained the rights to publish the "*Galawezh*" journal; between 1942-44 and fearing the punishment by the Iraqi authorities, Ibrahim Ahmad initially became a judge, having obtained a Law degree in Baghdad, and continued to secretly own the Galawezh journal. However, in 1944 Ibrahim Ahmad became acquainted with the socio-political movement of *Komalay Zhianaway Kurd* (Society of Kurdish Revival), a burgeoning and widely followed political movement that had started in the eastern Kurdistan, *Rojhilat*. Later, this acquaintance became the bedrock for the establishment of the most important and effective political parties among the Kurds, namely "*Parti Dimokrati Kurd la Eraq*[10]" (Kurdish Democratic Party in Iraq) (Merdox, 2010, p. 30).

As it can be suggested, there were a dual discourse of sovereignty, albeit in different shape and form progressing and molding during this period of Kurdistan's national movement; the former could be called a discourse of sovereignty backed up a popular support of a charismatic leader, and the latter an intellectual discourse of sovereignty. The intersecting point, the point of immense importance for either type of sovereignty-seeking discourse, is 1946 and the establishment of Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad. Either movement, at a particular time of their nascency, are introduced to the overwhelming discourse of independence thrived during the Kurdistan Republic of 1946-late1946. This created what Yildiz and Taysi refer to as "cross-border cooperation" (2007, pp. 63-64). The foremost significant instance of such cross-border cooperation occurred in the time "leading up to and during the existence of the Republic of Mahabad." (2007, pp. 63-64). The Komala, a political entity which could be known as the precursor to the KDP-I (Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iran), intended to formalize and expand its relations with non-Iranian Kurdish groups and

movements. "In 1944, Komala representatives met with *Bashur* and *Bakur* delegations at the border area of Mt. Dalanpar, at which time the Pact of the Three Borders was signed." (2007, pp. 63-64). We could argue that this Pact, a symbol of unity, remains as historical evidence of the desire of the Kurds for unifying under a central discourse of sovereignty.

Moreover, it is precisely at this period that Mulla Mustafa Barzani came to assist the formation and rule of Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad. "The Barzani tribe provided invaluable assistance to the *Rojhelat* Kurds, mainly in the form of the impressive force of military fighters that were integral to the protection of the republic." (2007, pp. 63-64). This interchange proved to be crucial in the following years since it planted the discourse of sovereignty, in its various forms, firmly at the heart of Kurdish national movement in *Bashur*, Southern Kurdistan[11].

On the other side of the discourse of sovereignty, the urbanite's discourse of intelligentsia was also introduced to the impetuous birth of the Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad. As mentioned above, Ibrahim Ahmed[12], a familiar name in Kurdish politics of the time due to his activism and literary works, became acquainted with the Republic in around the same time as did Mulla Mustafa Barzani. However, it could be said that their ultimate approach and recognition of this critical event had dissimilarities, or at least deviates. As Merdox points out, the extent of Ibrahim Ahmed's political affiliation with the political reality of the Republic was his membership in the *Komelei Zhianaway Kurd* (The Society of Kurdish Revival)'s branch in the Southern part of Kurdistan, or what is commonly referred to as "Iraqi part"[13] (2010, p. 31).

We could now presume that with such close affinities between the Kurdistan Republic and the southern Kurdistan's leadership of both "urban" and "traditional" activism, a clear link was established. Thus, we could agree with Neuberger (2014, p. 18) that pan-Kurdish "emotional identification" with the discourse of sovereignty embedded at the heart of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, more specifically in form of nationalistic movements, repeatedly manifested itself. Gunter (2004, p. 202) finds it quite telling that the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)[14] was only established after the fall of the Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad. Moreover, Olson (1991, p. 404) argues that, "In terms of Kurdish nationalism, it is important to note that in 1946 when important segments of Kurdish nationalists and Kurdish tribes from both Iran and Iraq cooperated, their movement was significantly strengthened". As a result of all the affiliation, cooperation, affinity, amalgamation, and unification of all the discursive forces at the time, a truly sovereignty-seeking subject started to appear. In this sense, and keeping in line with the

Foucauldian theory of subject formation, through the overpowered and dominant discourse of nationalism, again a sub-category to the discourse of sovereignty, the sovereignty-seeking subject was formed. It is true that the beginnings of such formation might have been at the levels of elites first, but it trickled down, or spread like wildfire through the entire societal corpus of Kurdistan society. Perhaps, the rise of political poetry is a testament to the efficacy of such dominant discourse.

In a sense, we could argue that during mid-1930s to late-1940s, Kurdish national revival among the urban elites and urbanites in general was considerably low-profile[15] compared to the overt resistances seen among the rural domains of Kurdistan. Within the Kurdish urban dwellers, the reality of political movement became more evident only after 1936 coup of Bakr Sidqi (McDowall, 2004, p. 288). This coup provoked anti-Kurdish sentiments and galvanized Arab nationalism among pan-Arabists (Khadduri, 1948, p. 278). The pan-Arabist sentiments, in turn, created greater enthusiasm among the Kurdish nationalists and motivated them to be more active within the spectrum of the civil society, and become more engaged politically. Even though Ibrahim Ahmed endeavored to moderate the Kurdish nationalistic sentiments, especially his opinion piece written for *Al-Akrad wa-l Arab* (Kurds and Arabs) journal[16], it was unmistaken to assume that a new class of political activism among the Kurds was on the march. It is precisely at this period of revival of Kurdish discourse of sovereignty that we witness the emergence of various political organizations, clandestine or otherwise. Komala-I Brayati (Brotherhood Society), fronted by Sheikh Latif[17], started its covert movement. In southern Kurdistan, following the Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji's revolt in Sulaimani and Kirkuk, Kurdish nationalists and leftist urban dwellers founded the four small organizations of Darkar (Woodcutters), Hiwa (Hope), and Azadi (Freedom), which became active throughout early to late 1930s (Gorgas, 2008, p. 448). When the KDP's eastern Kurdistan[18] branch surfaced in Mahabad, it significantly influenced the educated segments of society in Sulaimani and Kirkuk. These educated individuals, affiliated with the four small organizations mentioned earlier, collaborated to establish the KDP branch in southern Kurdistan[19] in August 1946. Subsequently, the KDP's branches in the Southern Kurdistan, operating clandestinely in Baghdad, Sulaimani, and Kirkuk, emerged as the most impactful underground political party following the demise of the Republic of Kurdistan in *Rojhilat* at the end of World War II (McDowall, 2004, p. 291) (Yuksel, 2021, pp. 214-218).

It could be argued that, among the mentioned socio-political gazettes and organizations, *Hiwa* was the most curious and important one. For instance, the very first issue of *Govari Hiwa* (Hiwa Magazine) (Govari-Hiwa,

1957) is claimed to be "a literary and scientific magazine"; however, from the very onset the nationalistic discourse is evident, especially in using a poem by the well-known Kurdish poet Kamaran in this first issue is an indication of the magazine's overall nationalistic discourse. Nevertheless, the explicit socio-political discourse of the magazine becomes even more tangible in the third and fourth issues of the magazine. In issue no. 3, the magazine takes a more socially-oriented turn discussing more socio-political topics. In a section written by Abdul-Qader Qazzaz, "How do we solve our social impasse?" the author delves deep into themes of nationalism, patriotism and love of one's nation (Qazzaz, 1957).

Following the revolts of 1943-45 by Mulla Mustafa Barzani, and the growth of Kurdistani's discourse toward a sense of sovereignty, *Hiwa*, as a political organization, was persistent in spreading the message of this movement in the Barzan area to a wider audience. McDowall argues that the efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, since the organization was split into two political blocs, the conservatives who clung to the hope of help from Britain and the radicals who believed the Soviets offered both practical and ideological rescue from British and Arab colonialism" (2004, p. 294). It is clear, therefore, the extent to which Kurdish intra-political discourses were directly affected by the global discourse of the time, namely the clash of western pro-capitalist bloc with the eastern communist bloc. *Hiwa* disintegrated in 1944, giving way to the creating of a plethora of smaller social clubs[20]. However, as the Kurdistan Republic's fate was sealed by the end of 1946, the Kurdish national movement was dispersed. Mulla Mustafa Barzani had to battle his way through skirmishes and mountainous terrains to cross the Aras River and find safety in soviet Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the Kurdish discourse of sovereignty and nationalistic sentiments did not fade. Among the plethora of different socio-political groups, one stood out, namely *Parti Rizgari Kurd* (Kurdish Liberation). Established in 1945 and activated mostly in Baghdad, this political organization made contact with Barzani in Mahabad. This made sure that even after the fall of the Republic, and the consequent self-exile of Barzani to the Soviet Union, the discourse of sovereignty and self-determination continued. The endurance of *Hiwa* and *Rizgari* was similar, yet their achievements varied. Rizgari, unlike its predecessor Hiwa, was able to produce a formal political programme which "unequivocally sought the freedom and unification of Kurdistan" (McDowall, 2004, p. 294). Even though no manuscripts of the Rizgari newspaper are available, as Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin argues, there are few of the political and ideological evidences of this political organization which emphasize the nationalistic objectives of Rizgari's political agenda. For instance, in the announcement of the founding committee of this political organization it is clearly stated that "the objective is unification and emancipation of the Greater Kurdistan. Since the party is located in Bashur, we strive to emancipate both Kurdistan and Iraq from imperialistic and chauvinistic governments… which impede the Kurdish struggle to achieve the rights of self-rule" (Amin, 2004). The political leitmotif of Rizgari could be described as to be two-folds: "an interim objectives included administrative independence inside Iraq and the establishment of coordinated co-operation with Kurdish parties outside Iraq. In January 1946 it appealed formally to the United Nation for Kurdish self-determination and sovereignty" (McDowall, 2004, p. 294). Rizgari[21], as a political organization, laid the foundations of the establishment for the most successful political movement in the modern Kurdish history, namely the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Established in August 16 1946[22], KDP was initiated under the political discourse of nationalism, seeking the unification of Kurds under one banner[23]. By the time of the first congress of the KDP in Baghdad in 1946, Mulla Mustafa Barzani was the president in exile of the party, with Hamza Abdullah as the secretary-general of the party, and Shaykh Latif and Ziyad Agha as vice-presidents (Barzani, 2020, p. 188)

The socio-political discourse, and indeed even the economic discourse, among the Kurds from 1946 until 1958 underwent a variety of transformations and minutiae. For instance, in 1948, addressing a congress where the Kurdish representatives from both Iran and Iraq had gathered in Baku, Mulla Mustafa Barzani delivered an impassioned speech where he laid out the general direction of the movement. As the foundation of this socio-political movement, Barzani referred to three different dimensions: political goals, economic goals and social goals. To better grasp the political discourse of that time, it is important to refer to the exact content of the speech here. In his speech, Barzani outlined the movement's political, economic, and social aspirations.

Politically, Barzani urged for the establishment of a democratic republic in *Rojhelat* with a national parliament elected by secret ballot. He also emphasized the necessity for political alliances with other non-Kurdish democratic parties in Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Turkey, and cooperation with progressive movements across the Middle East, including the Soviet Union, to counter authoritarianism and foreign imperialism, aiming for Kurdish liberation. For instance, article number 3 of this speech highlights the following objective:

> "The republic that is to be formed in Iran must be the foreground for the liberation of the Greater Kurdistan. This Republic shall endeavor to establish democratic political parties in both Iraq and Turkey

to strengthen socio-political movements there. Until all Kurds are liberated from the chains of captivity and foreign interference, the struggle will continue," (Barzani, 2020, pp. 399-403).

In terms of economic goals, Barzani aimed at improving the living conditions in pastoral areas, promoting "collective ownership of natural resources" and "land redistribution to peasants" (ibid). He called for the expansion of key industries like agriculture and steel, and proposed laws to safeguard fair distribution of goods and shield workers' rights. In this sense, Barzani argued for "a labor law that shall be ratified to protect the workers' rights and to guarantee fair remittances for the working hours" (ibid). He also advocated the abolition of foreign monopolies; in their stead, and in accordance with the national interest, as argued by Barzani, "under the supervision of the national government, national corporations shall be established" (ibid).

Socially, Barzani gave priority to a number of reforms in education sector, as well as making primary education mandatory and promoting higher education. Moreover, the social objectives included the eradication of feudalism, tribalism, and discrimination, and pushed for the establishment of hospitals, youth organizations, labor unions, and civil syndicates. Article number 2 of the social goals promoted by him indicates the following:

"A decisive struggle must be waged against the spirit of feudalism, nobility, tribalism and populism and against wicked differences such as religious or ethnic differences." (ibid)

He also defended freedom of speech and religion, and the modernization of agriculture and animal husbandry. Barzani's overarching social goals, as indicated in his speech, included mandatory military training for all Kurds, reforming the party based on democratic principles, and uniting all social classes under the party's banner to protect collective interests (ibid).

He underscored the necessity for a "democratic sovereignty" in Kurdistan, free from "imperialist control, and committed to opposing any organization or sovereignty" that did not line up with these principles. The last paragraph of his speech is by far the most relevant to the topic of this paper which put forth the following agenda:

"As a result of this decisive struggle, the form of the absolute democratic sovereignty that will be established in Kurdistan must be reflected in the curriculum and program of our party; that is why we can ensure the true interests and freedom of the Kurdish nation. Furthermore, any kind of rule that is established in Kurdistan under the

guise of democracy and in the name of freedom as a result of the destroyed imperialist thought and imagination is in the interests of the Kurds who want to expand the Kurdish nation and free them from the yokes of slavery. Therefore, our duty is to reveal the fraudulence of any kind of organization or sovereignty that is not inspired by our party and is not established on the basis of democracy under the leadership of democratic principles. We are, therefore, obliged to fight against that kind of organization or sovereignty and all other imperialist conspiracies." (Barzani, 2020, pp. 399-403)

Firstly, we could find traces of the discourse of sovereignty within the context of the above excerpt. The Kurdish political framework laid out in the 1948 speech in Baku serves as a cornerstone in understanding the aspirations, struggles, and objectives of the Kurdish people in their pursuit of self-governance and autonomy. Firstly, the "political goals" could well be a reflection of the wider global discourse of the time. The world in 1948 was divided into two blocs, the western capitalist and the eastern communist; as a result, it is not too surprising to discover the Kurdish discourse to resonate this reality. The political goals expressed in the above text highlights the establishment of a democratic republic in Kurdistan, reflective of the Kurdish people's desire for self-rule. This is a clear-cut evidence of the dominant discourse of sovereignty among the very elites of Kurdistan's political class. It is also worth our attention to point out the democratic nature of such discourse. In the political prospects of the KDP, Mulla Mustafa Barzani calls for a national majlis to be elected through secret ballots; this in itself underscores the significance of representative governance and the exercise of sovereignty in determining the political future of Kurdistan. Furthermore, politically, Kurdish discourse of sovereignty seems to be under the influence of Soviet-backed discourse of anti-imperial sentiments. The political agenda puts emphasis on forming coalitions with like-minded groups and resisting foreign imperialism which underlines the assertion of Kurdish sovereignty against external interference. This is also another indication that Kurdish discourse is consciously aware of its "colonized" status at this stage.

Secondly, the economic goals carry heavy undertone of leftist discourse; nevertheless, this also showcases the lively interaction of Kurdish discourse of sovereignty with the wider and global discourse of its time. The economic goals outlined in the text draw attention to the importance of sovereignty in resource management and equitable distribution, thus, making achievement of

socio-economic justice a priority to engrain the discourse of sovereignty rightly at the heart of its subjects. The collective ownership of natural resources and the redistribution of lands occupied by colonizers reflect the Kurdish people's assertion of control over their economic destiny. Moreover, the establishment of national corporations and the prohibition of foreign companies demonstrate the Kurdish commitment to economic sovereignty and self-reliance.

Thirdly, if we take a closer glance over the nature of the social goals advocated in the text above, we could find the resonance of the discourse of sovereignty. Opposing any sort of subaltern discourse or any subjugation to a foreign master, the social goals are the embodiment of Kurdish resolve to improve the general status of the society, and giving priority to the greater inclusion of women. The social goals voiced in the abovementioned text bring to light the Kurdish people's desire for cultural preservation, education, and healthcare, all of which are integral to the exercise of a popular sovereignty. The emphasis on education in the Kurdish language, the eradication of feudalism and tribalism, and the promotion of freedom of speech reflect the Kurdish aspiration[1] to shape their societal norms and institutions in alignment with their cultural identity and values.

Lastly, it is right at the end of the list of goals in the above text, the "general goals" that we are truly presented with KDP's vision and discourse with regard to the importance of sovereignty. The general goals outlined in the text endorse the Kurdish discourse committed to sovereignty and self-determination. The demand for obligatory military training, educational and curriculum reform, and the inclusive representation of the entire social strata give emphasis to the Kurdish nation's subject formation in shaping their collective destiny and defending their rights against external threats. Furthermore, the denunciation of non-democratic forms of governance and the commitment to fighting imperialist conspiracies highlight the Kurdish determination to safeguard their sovereignty against external manipulation.

All in all, we could argue that the discourse of sovereignty at this stage of the southern Kurdistan's modern history infiltrates every aspect of Kurdish socio-political as well as economic discourse; from political representation to economic empowerment and social liberation, the general Kurdish discourse aspires to self-governance and autonomy, which in turn, are deeply rooted in the affirmation of sovereignty over Kurdistan's land, resources, and cultural identity. By understanding the significance of sovereignty within the Kurdish context at this stage, we gain valuable insights into the complexities of the struggles and the importance of international support in their quest for self-determination.

5. CONCLUSION

The close linkage between KDP's overall discourse with the communist bloc could be a result of two major factors: first, Mulla Mustafa Barzani was in exile in the Soviet Union[2]; second, KDP, in Southern Kurdistan, consisted of several party members whose past political activism was through Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). These two factors could explain the seemingly overwhelming communistic discourse within the KDP's agenda. Even though the linkage is tangible, the actual discourse does not form a totally communistic subject among the Kurdish liberation movement. Instead, the Kurdish subject, under the influence of the discourse of sovereignty is galvanized and becomes active adherent of nationalistic sentiments. This is quite significant, since at the heart of communism, there is an internationalist discourse. The historical background as well as the social reality of Kurdish territories could have easily shaped an archetypal communist subject. Particularly, during the reign of King Faisal in Iraq, the circumstances were ripe for the emergence of such a revolutionary class among the Kurds. However, this outcome did not materialize.

It is also imperative to draw attention to the absence, or rather the comparative frailty, of other rival discourses in Kurdistan during this period. In the beginning we had indicated three rivaling discourses, namely the sovereignty-seeking, subaltern, and political Islam. At this stage, based on the evidences that have been investigated, the dominant discourse was that of sovereignty-seeking. The general Kurdish sentiment during this nascent stage, and the aftermath of World War II, could be depicted as a strong desire among the Kurdish population for greater autonomy or independence. Additionally, this was stimulated by a history of marginalization and broken promises from various states that controlled parts of Kurdistan. Furthermore, the political backdrop in Iraq, and Post-war Iraq, was a monarchy under Faisal II, influenced heavily by British interests. This further galvanized the Kurdish discourse to seek independence, albeit in gradual steps. This political landscape was tumultuous, with various factions vying for power, including nationalists, communists, and Islamists, both among the Kurds as well

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[1] To what extend all these socio-political objectives made practical contribution could still be up for debate. Perhaps this requires a separate and detailed analysis.

[2] However, this is a highly contested claim since historical evidences show that Mulla Mustafa Barzani barely became infatuated with the Communistic discourse.

as other parts of Iraq. However, the Kurdish movement, under the leadership of figures such as Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who emerged as a prominent Kurdish leader, rallied Kurdish subjects under the discourse of sovereignty. Barzani and his followers had been involved in conflicts with the Iraqi government before 1945 and continued to push for Kurdish rights and autonomy well after this stage. No longer would the target of the revolutionary discourse be "an imperialist puppet monarch". Instead, the discourse changed towards seeking autonomous rights and self-rule. Kurds originally saw this as a first positive change, hoping the new government would be more favorable to their cause, since they were active in undermining the Hashemite rule and its eventual overthrow.

As a result of this paper, we could propose the following findings. Firstly, during the given historical period, the Kurdish discourse of sovereignty was at the stage of nascency where the discursive attention was vehemently supporting for a full-independence. This could be a natural outcome since the Kurdish collective consciousness at this stage was following the fresh memory of the Kurdistan Republic in Mahabd. Secondly, we could identify communistic undertones within the over socio-political discourse of this time. This is also unsurprising. Given the fact that the Kurdish leadership, be it Mulla Mustafa Barzani in his exile or the clandestine movements in Bashur, were heavily influenced by the communistic political movements at the time, it would therefore be a legitimate claim to argue that elements of Marxist ideology could be traced in the discourse of sovereignty during this historical phase in recent Kurdish history. Thirdly, we could argue that the subaltern discourse, a discourse that stands in stark contrast to the discourse of sovereignty, as well as religiously oriented discourse are largely absent during this period. All these could, therefore, support the initial hypothesis of this paper which tried to investigate the genealogical basis for the concept of sovereignty among the Kurdish leadership and wider Kurdish society during the given historical period. It also clarified how the initial stages for the formation of a socio-political discourse for sovereignty have been formed. However, one area of analysis which could be expanded in future researches is to investigate the extent to which all these socio-political objectives made practical contribution and implications. Perhaps this requires a separate and detailed analysis

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APPENDIX

[1] . A philosophical take on the relationship between this duality was most notably sketched out by G.F.W. Hegel in his Phenomenology of Spirit. See Invalid source specified.

[2] . This is an umbrella term for an entirety of theoretical analysis about social and cultural issues. Of all various theories and methods, Discourse Analysis is but a more popular tool among many.

[3] . The *Archeology of Knowledge* is deemed the most "structuralist" work written by Michel Foucault.

[4] . Ibrahim Effendi al-Haydari (minister without portfolio and former Shaykh al-Islam), Abouk Pasha (minister of public works and former minister of war), and Awni Pasha (minister of the marine) as representatives of Ottoman government; Shaykh Abd al-Qadir of Nehri and emirs Amin Ali and Murad Badir Khan, as representatives of Kurdish National Committee.

[5] . Treaty of Serves was by all standards the most potent sign of Kurdish discourse of sovereignty back in 1920. The treaty is a historical milestone. Articles 62-64 of the treaty directly deal with the Kurdish independence from Ottoman Empire. Article 62 asks for the provision of a committee to draft a scheme for local autonomy for predominantly Kurdish speaking areas. Article 63 indicated the acceptance and execution of article 62 by Turkish government. Article 64 indicated the timeline for the Kurds to apply to the Council of the League of Nations and express their desires for independence. (See (Jwaideh, 2006, p. 131).

[6] . This is an important of part of Kurdistan's history. However, in order to stay focused and precise, it is needed to mention this stage briefly and delve into later years in more details. In order to see some works in this regard, please refer to Othman Ali's "*The Kurds and the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-23*" (1997, pp. 521-534).

[7] . The term "Kurdistan" refers to the geographic region primarily inhabited by the Kurdish people, spanning parts of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. In the common references, the partitioned Kurdistan fragments are called, *Bakur* (part of modern-day Turkey), *Basur* (in modern day Iraq), *Rojhilat* (within borders of Iran), *and Rojava* (part of Syria). Southern Kurdistan is the English equivalent to the word *Basur*, the main geographical focus of this research.

[8] . The two leading figures of this discourse were Mulla Mustafa Barzani and Ibrahim Ahmed. Of course, their approaches and types of discourses would reconcile and fall out continually. However, we should categorize them under the same archeology of discourse of sovereignty. Due to their immense impact, at times one more than the other, they are chosen as personification of discourse of sovereignty, in their varying degrees of course, for this research.

[9] . He remains a constant political leader throughout this period, causing Iraqi government much headache.

[10] . Of course, the history of the establishment of this political party is widely discussed; it should be stated that the political party undergoes many transformations, from its name to the leading figures in it. This will be discussed intensively from a discursive lens.

[11] . "During the time in which the Iraqi Kurds, led by the Barzani, launched their insurrection against the Iraqi state, the Iranian Kurds offered their support, either by crossing the border and acting as peshmerga, or through the smuggling of supplies in to Iraq. In fact, until the late 1960s, the KDP-I was the only major source of outside aid for the Barzani peshmerga." (2007, pp. 63-64)

[12] . Having travelled to Baghdad to continue his education in law, Ahmed joins "Komala-I Lawan" (Young Men's Club) in 1930 which was an ostensibly literary and cultural center, with an "unstated political program.

[13] . I will try to refrain from using this term since it stands in clear opposition to the intention of this research.

[14] . We could argue that at this stage of modern history of southern Kurdistan, KDP is not merely a political party per se, but a socio-economic movement as well.

[15] . However, this will certainly grow in force later.

[16] . "In AI Akrad wa-l Arab ([he Kurds and the Arabs) Ahmad claimed that the cause of conflict between the Kurds and Arabs was not inter-communal tension but government oppression which fell on all communities regardless. He warned against blind nationalism that disregarded others, avoided nationalist claims for the Kurds per se, and advanced the idea of democracy and brotherhood in equality for the nations of the region" (McDowall, 2004, p. 289).

[17] . Sheikh Mahmoud's son.

[18] . This commonly referred to as "KDPI" which translates into Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iran. However, it is necessary to get accustomed to using an entirely and more proto-sovereignty label such the one suggested above.

[19] . Again, the usual reference is KDP-Iraq.

[20] . It should not be forgotten that, during this period of history, the initial socio-political activities of Kurds were in coordination with the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). Thus, to assume that the communistic fervent and sentiments were quite evident is an understatement.

[21] . The political activities of this organization later are faced with considerable pressure from the then Iraqi government and are therefore after months of struggle, the party is dissolved.

[22] . Ibrahim Ahmed joins this political movement after much chagrin in 1947. However, his eventual membership is testament to the fact that the Kurdish subject, regardless of political or social differences, becomes fully aware of its national awareness.

[23] . Of course, like any socio-political movements, KDP also faced with criticisms and opponents. Shurish, a political party closely linked with the Iraqi communist party (ICP) opposed what was thought to be "a tribal foundation of KDP". But, all opponents of the KDP eventually either dismantle or become part of the social movement spearheaded by KDP.