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Relevant market definition is key to any determination by the court or competition authority when ascertaining the level of competition in an industry or the likelihood of anti-competition conducts by the players in an industry. Using doctrinal method of research, this paper examines the provision of the Act in line with the peculiar nature of the digital market which operates on zero pricing with no possibility of price increase. The paper finds inter alia that the pricing criterion for relevant market definition does not fit digital market. The theory of harm introduced by the Act as an omnibus criterion for relevant market definition is not either very much helpful. The paper recommends the adoption of a modified Small but Insignificant Non-Transitory Increase in Cost (SSNIC) test. When using this test, the cost should be defined as consumer’s attention that amounts to the 5% to 10 % of the digital content.
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